Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information by Spector-Bagdady, Kayte & Pike, Elizabeth R
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 92 | Issue 4 Article 2
2014
Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information
Kayte Spector-Bagdady
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, Kayte.Spector-Bagdady@Bioethics.gov
Elizabeth R. Pike
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, lizzypike@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Kayte Spector-Bagdady and Elizabeth R. Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information,
92 Neb. L. Rev. (2014)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol92/iss4/2
Kayte Spector-Bagdady, J.D., M. Bioethics and
Elizabeth Pike, J.D., LL.M.*
Consuming Genomics: Regulating
Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and
Genomic Information
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 678
II. Access to One’s Own Genetic Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
A. The Human Genome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 684
B. Origins and Evolution of Genetic Testing . . . . . . . . . . 686
1. From Discrete Genetic Tests to Large-Scale
Testing and Genomic Sequencing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 687
2. From Clinician-Provided Testing to Direct-to-
Consumer Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 689
C. Concerns Raised by Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 690
1. Investigation by the Government Accountability
Office in 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 692
2. Reports of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee
on Genetics, Health, and Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 693
3. Investigation by the Government Accountability
Office in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 696
III. Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing . . . . . . . . 697
A. Food and Drug Administration: Regulation of
Medical Devices and Engagement with the Direct-
to-Consumer Genetic-Testing Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 698
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
* Kayte Spector-Bagdady, J.D., M. Bioethics is an associate director at the Presi-
dential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues.  Elizabeth R. Pike, J.D.,
LL.M., is a senior policy and research analyst with the Presidential Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues.  The authors would like to thank Lisa M. Lee,
Ph.D., M.S., and Paul Lombardo, J.D., Ph.D., for their thoughtful review of this
Article.  The findings and conclusions in this Article are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official position of the Presidential Commission
for the Study of Bioethical Issues or the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices.  Use of official trade names does not mean or imply official support or en-
dorsement by the authors.
677
678 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:677
1. Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of
Medical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 699
2. Exemptions for Genetic Tests Under In Vitro
Diagnostic Device Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 702
3. FDA Sends Notification Letters to Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic-Testing Companies . . . . . . . . . . 704
a. Food and Drug Administration Untitled
Letters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705
b. Food and Drug Administration Warning
Letter to 23andMe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 710
c. What the Food and Drug Administration
Letters Mean for the Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713
B. Federal Trade Commission: Regulation of
Advertising and Engagement with the Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic-Testing Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717
C. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments . . . . 719
D. Patent and Trademark Office and the Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. . . . 722
E. State Law’s Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 726
IV. Regulating Bifurcated Direct-to-Consumer Genetic-
Testing Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
A. The Bifurcation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic-
Testing Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 728
B. Regulating Entities Producing Genetic Data . . . . . . . 730
C. The Challenges of Regulating Entities That Provide
Genetic Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 731
1. Regulating DTC Web-Based Genetic
Interpretation Services: In Search of an
Analogy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732
a. WebMD’s Symptom Checker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 732
b. Mobile Medical Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 734
c. Software Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 735
2. First Amendment Challenges to Regulation . . . . 735
V. Risk-Based Regulation of Entities That Interpret
Genetic Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 742
VI. Conclusions and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 743
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, two direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic-testing companies
began offering consumers an interpretation of 0.03% of their genome
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for $1000.1  In the years since, the popularity of, and scientific know-
how behind, genetic testing has exploded.2  The healthcare industry
has spent an estimated $5 billion on genetic testing to date, with $20
billion more expected by 2021.3  President Barack Obama’s Presiden-
tial Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues recently released
one report focusing on privacy and progress in whole genome (geno-
mic) sequencing4 and another considering the ethical issues facing the
direct-to-consumer industry;5 coverage about the influence of genetic
testing on celebrity medical decisions has reverberated throughout the
lay media;6 the recent Supreme Court decision of Association for Mo-
lecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics established the nonpatentability
of genetic material;7 and a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
warning sent to 23andMe on November 22, 2013,8 and the company’s
1. See, e.g., Sancy A. Leachman et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Personal-
ized Medicine in Evolution, AM. SOC’Y CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, 2011, at 34, 35.
2. Timothy Leslie et al., Market Trends in Genetic Services: Impacting Clinical Care
for Better Prediction, Detection, and Care Selection, BOOZALLEN.COM, http://www.
boozallen.com/media/file/GeneticTesting_VP.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (not-
ing that the more than 1600 genetic tests available in 2008 nearly doubled by
2012).
3. New Report Finds Greater Use of Genetic Testing, but Half of Physicians Con-
cerned About Their Lack of Familiarity with Genetic Tests, UNITEDHEALTH GROUP
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.unitedhealthgroup.com/Newsroom/Articles/News/
UnitedHealth%20Group/2012/0312GeneticTesting.aspx.
4. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRI-
VACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING (2012), available at http://
bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY
AND PROGRESS].
5. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, ANTIC-
IPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY
FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER CONTEXTS
(2013), available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCom-
municate_PCSBI_0.pdf [hereinafter ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE].
6. See, e.g., Angelina Jolie, Op-Ed, My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2013, at
A25; Ed Payne, Angelina Jolie Undergoes Double Mastectomy, CNN ENT. (May
16, 2013, 8:09 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/14/showbiz/angelina-jolie-
double-mastectomy; Maria Puente et al., Angelina Jolie’s Mastectomy News
Shocks, Enlightens, USA TODAY (May 14, 2013, 10:23 PM), http://www.usatoday.
com/story/life/people/2013/05/14/angelina-jolie-double-mastectomy-shocks-im-
presses-enlightens-the-world/2158489/; Scott Hensley, Angelina Jolie’s Mastec-
tomy Decision and Weighing Cancer Risks, NPR (May 5, 2013, 10:29 AM), http://
www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/05/15/184166941/angelina-jolies-mastectomy-de-
cision-and-weighing-cancer-risks.
7. 133 S. Ct. 2017 (2013).
8. See Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radio-
logical Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Food & Drug Admin., U.S.
Dep’t of Health & Human Services, to Ann[e] Wojcicki, C.E.O., 23andMe, Inc.
(Nov. 22, 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warn-
ingletters/2013/ucm376296.htm [hereinafter Warning Letter to Wojcicki].
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subsequent hiatus from the health-related information market,9 have
critically shaped scholarly debate about the science and ethics of, and
reinforced the public’s interest in access to, health-related genetic in-
formation.10  Despite this increasing visibility, DTC genetic testing
has met with controversy and complications throughout its short
history.
The medical testing of human genetic material began with discrete
genetic tests that looked at a single gene to obtain an answer to a
targeted question about a potentially devastating medical condition—
such as whether a person was at a high risk to develop Huntington’s
disease.11  It has since transitioned to large-scale genetic testing or
genomic sequencing, returning information about many or all of a per-
son’s genes, including those for which the function and significance is
still unclear.12  During this time, both targeted and large-scale testing
moved from being within the exclusive province of the clinic—where
healthcare professionals were the gatekeepers of this information—to
DTC entities that provide genetic data and interpreted information
directly to consumers without a clinician intermediary.
Over the past several years, the DTC genetic-testing industry has
been the subject of a number of government investigations, including
one in 2006 by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO); two
reports by the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health,
and Society in 2008 and 2010; and a subsequent GAO investigation in
2010.  These reports raised serious concerns about the validity and
utility of the genetic testing performed by the companies and the med-
ical information that DTC companies were producing and selling to
consumers.
Despite these investigations, the DTC genetic-testing industry
flourished until 2010, when Pathway Genomics announced that it was
going to partner with Walgreens and sell its DTC genetic tests in drug
stores across the country.13  This garnered the attention of FDA,
9. 23andMe, Inc. Provides Update on FDA Regulatory Review, 23ANDME (Dec. 5,
2013), http://mediacenter.23andme.com/press-releases/23andme-inc-provides-up-
date-on-fda-regulatory-review/ [hereinafter 23andMe, Inc. Provides Update].
10. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Justices, 9–0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 2013, at A1.
11. See infra subsection II.B.1.
12. This Article uses the term “genomic testing” to mean large-scale or whole genome
testing (i.e., testing most if not all of a person’s nuclear DNA).  The term “genetic
testing” can also include whole genome analysis as well as looking at only one or
several discrete genes.  Therefore, while all genomic testing is also appropriately
described as genetic testing, not all genetic testing includes the analysis of
enough genes to be considered genomic testing.
13. See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Walgreens Delays Selling Personal Genetic Test Kit,
N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, at B5 [hereinafter Pollack—Walgreens Delays]; State-
ment Before the H. Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 11 (2010) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, M.D.,
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which responded by sending twenty-three letters warning companies
of potential Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act violations and stating that
DTC genetic tests were medical devices that needed to be cleared or
approved by FDA.14  Soon thereafter, many DTC genetic-testing com-
panies either altered their models by requiring a physician order or
intermediary or collapsed entirely.  23andMe also began to work with
FDA on clearance filings in 2012,15 but in 2013 FDA halted 23andMe’s
health-related offerings indefinitely.16
Even before 23andMe stopped marketing its health-related prod-
uct, however, some DTC companies began to bifurcate into entities
that offer genetic data—a file of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs without any inter-
pretation—and entities that interpret and analyze this genetic data to
provide medical information—for example the consumer’s risk of de-
veloping breast cancer.17
While these bifurcated companies might still be unfamiliar to the
public, their influence has played a role, for example, in the well-
known case of Henrietta Lacks.  The 2010 book The Immortal Life of
Henrietta Lacks tells the story of a woman who went to the Johns Hop-
kins Hospital in 1951 for clinical care for her cervical cancer.  Unbe-
knownst to Mrs. Lacks, her clinicians retained specimens of her
cancerous tissue for research purposes.18  The unique and invaluable
replicating propensities of her cancer cells enabled the creation of the
Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Services), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testi-
mony/ucm219925.htm [hereinafter Shuren—Statement].
14. See, e.g., Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Ctr. for Devices and Radiological
Health, FDA, to James Plante, Founder and CEO, Pathway Genomics Corp. (May
10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/In-
dustry/ucm211866.htm [hereinafter Letter to Plante].
15. 23andMe Takes First Step Toward FDA Clearance, 23ANDME BLOG (July 30,
2012), http://blog.23andme.com/news/23andme-takes-first-step-toward-fda-clear-
ance/.  The 510(k) de novo review process is for products that do not rise to the
level of Class III regulation. See FDA—DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION, infra note 145,
at 5 (“If we grant the de novo petition, the device is reclassified from class III into
class I or class II.”).
16. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.  Current genetic-testing options, even
those that are quasi-DTC, are limited and include Genetic Testing Laboratories
(which requires that the DNA sample be taken by “your physician”) and Pathway
Genomics (which requires a physician order).  See DNA Predisposition Testing,
GENETIC TESTING LABORATORIES INC., http://www.gtldna.com/HealthTesting/
DNA-Predisposition-Testing.htm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014); General Questions,
PATHWAY GENOMICS, https://www.pathway.com/about-us/faqs (last visited Jan. 1,
2014).
17. See, e.g., Dan Vorhaus, DNA DTC: The Return of Direct to Consumer Whole Gen-
ome Sequencing, GENOMICS LAW REP. (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.genomicslaw
report.com/index.php/2012/11/29/dna-dtc-the-return-of-direct-to-consumer-
whole-genome-sequencing/ [hereinafter Vorhaus—DNA DTC].
18. See generally REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (Broad-
way Books 2011) (2010) [hereinafter SKLOOT—THE IMMORTAL LIFE].
682 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:677
first human cell line, and this “HeLa” line was subsequently distrib-
uted across the world, enabling countless research protocols and ren-
dering Mrs. Lacks “the godmother of virology and then biotech,
benefiting practically anyone who’s ever taken a pill stronger than as-
pirin.”19  The HeLa cells did not, however, benefit Mrs. Lacks’s own
family any more than any other.  The Lacks family did not even know
Mrs. Lacks’s cells had been taken in the first place.  While this part of
the Henrietta Lacks story has become popularized, in 2013 research-
ers at the European Molecular Biology Laboratory sequenced the
HeLa cells and publically posted the genomic sequence of Mrs. Lacks’s
cancer cells without consent from the Lacks family.  This raw data file
of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs did not convey medical information in and of
itself; the European Molecular Biology Laboratory stated in a news
release that “We cannot infer anything about Henrietta Lacks’s gen-
ome, or of her descendants, from the data generated in this study.”20
However, the emergence of new DTC web-based genetic interpretation
entities transforms the value of raw genomic data—other scientists
were immediately able to upload Mrs. Lacks’s genomic data into
openSNP, a service that interpreted the data and provided access to
her medical information.21
With 23andMe’s health-related product currently off the market,
bifurcated genetic entities are not only the next frontier, but the only
currently viable option for DTC access to genetic health-related infor-
mation.  This Article is one of the first to analyze the effect of the
23andMe Warning Letter on the industry, to focus on the bifurcation
of genetic interpretation and information as an independent medical
device, and to analyze future regulatory approaches available to FDA.
Part II of this Article offers an overview of public access to genetic
information: the significance of genetic information, the transition
from discrete genetic testing to large-scale genetic testing and geno-
mic sequencing, and the movement of genetic interpretation from the
clinic to DTC.  This Part will also discuss government scrutiny of the
DTC genetic-testing industry.
Part III of this Article will conduct a deeper examination of the
agencies poised to regulate DTC genetic testing.  This Part analyzes
FDA’s Untitled and Warning Letters and highlights four major in-
sights for the industry going forward.  But, although FDA is best-posi-
tioned to regulate the industry, it is not the only agency with the
power to engage.  Several other federal agencies—such as the U.S.
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the U.S. Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS)—can also influence access to, and the
19. See Lisa Margonelli, Eternal Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2010, at 20.
20. Rebecca Skloot, The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks, The Sequel, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2013, at SR4.
21. Id.
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validity and utility of, DTC genetic testing.  Finally, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Myriad, invalidating patents on human ge-
netic material, eliminates a potential barrier to DTC genetic testing
and suggests a way in which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) can help ensure continued access to certain types of genetic in-
terpretation.  Part III will clarify the ways these agencies can support
access to valid and useful genetic information and will highlight their
limitations in this rapidly evolving field.  State law provides an addi-
tional layer enhancing federal protections.
Part IV considers the particular challenges associated with regu-
lating bifurcated genetic data and interpretation entities.  Entities
that merely provide genetic data are likely to remain unregulated
both because they do not satisfy FDA’s definition of a medical device
and because FDA officials have explicitly disclaimed interest in their
regulation.  Entities that interpret genetic data and provide associated
medical information, even without access to the underlying biological
sample, give rise to a different analysis.  Here, comparisons to FDA
regulatory approaches taken with WebMD and mobile medical devices
will likely fall short, whereas the approach taken with regulating
software might be helpful—but even then, regulation of DTC interpre-
tation services will face serious First Amendment scrutiny.
Part V offers a risk-based stratification approach to regulate large-
scale genetic and genomic information as a medical device—treating
interpretation of large-scale genetic data and genomic sequences as a
compilation of smaller products as opposed to a single device.  This
would allow FDA to continue its regulatory focus on genetic interpre-
tation that carries the greatest possible risk to the consumer (such as
analyzing genes associated with diagnosing a predisposition to breast
cancer for which individuals could seek out risky medical interven-
tions such as mastectomy) without allocating time and energy to ge-
netic interpretation that carries little to no risk (such as analyzing
genes associated with earwax type).
FDA has made clear that it will treat DTC genetic tests, including
individual components used to produce patient-specific information,
as medical devices falling under its regulations—and that labeling
these devices as for educational or research use only while marketing
them for health-related indications or knowingly selling them to com-
panies will not shield the manufacturer from enforcement.  Also, al-
though FDA might consider some genetic tests as falling into lower-
risk regulatory categories, a manufacturer’s decision not to validate or
substantiate individual tests might result in an entire genetic or geno-
mic interpretation device being classified in a higher-risk regulatory
category, thereby requiring full FDA premarket approval.  However,
as companies continue to bifurcate into entities that produce data- or
information-only products, including entities that provide Internet-
684 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:677
based, open-source genetic and genomic interpretation, FDA will face
increasing difficulty enforcing its medical device regulations as typi-
cally done.  If FDA and the DTC industry approach large-scale genetic
and genomic interpretation as a compilation of discrete genetic tests,
they can address the riskiest aspects of the product without allowing
the evolving field to overwhelm current quality assurances and with-
out limiting consumer access to accurate and valid genetic
information.
II. ACCESS TO ONE’S OWN GENETIC INFORMATION
From time immemorial, humans have asked existential questions
about the nature of identity and the origins of disease.  The discovery
of DNA as heritable genetic material brought with it the potential to
delve deeper into these compelling issues.  In 1990, a scientific collec-
tive sought to unlock some of these answers by sequencing the entire
human genome.22  In the years since, knowledge about the human
genome has expanded exponentially, as has the ability to interrogate
genetic information using discrete genetic tests, large-scale genetic
testing, and genomic sequencing.23  Although once within the exclu-
sive province of medical professionals, genetic testing has increasingly
been offered directly to consumers in the absence of any clinician in-
volvement.24  This Part explains the importance of the human genome
and describes the evolution of the DTC genetic-testing industry.  It
also describes government concerns regarding medical information
sold DTC.
A. The Human Genome
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is one of the fundamental building
blocks of life.25  Found in nearly every living organism, DNA is made
up of four nucleotide bases—adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C),
and guanine (G).  These nucleotide bases form consistent pairs be-
tween the two strands of DNA, forming a sequence that provides in-
structions for biological functioning.26
In humans, the genomic sequence is approximately three billion
nucleotide base pairs long27 and is stored in the nucleus of an individ-
22. See infra section II.A.
23. See infra section II.B.
24. See infra subsection II.B.2.
25. DNA was first identified and isolated by Friedrich Miescher, and the discovery of
the double helix is attributed to James Watson, Francis Crick, and Rosalind
Franklin. See, e.g., Ralf Dahm, Friedrich Miescher and the Discovery of DNA,
278 DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 274, 284 (2005) (displaying a timeline that shows
contributions to the discovery of DNA by different individuals).
26. See, e.g., PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 4, at 109.
27. See, e.g., id. at 110.
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ual’s cells in tightly wound super-coils called chromosomes.28  A com-
plete sequence of an individual’s nuclear DNA is called an individual’s
genome.29  All human beings share approximately 99.9% of genetic in-
formation.30  The small percentage of genetic variation among individ-
uals, however, gives rise to humanity’s wide-ranging diversity and
individual biological characteristics.31
Sequencing—learning the order of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs— the human
genome uncovers any variants encoded in an individual’s DNA.32  Ge-
netic variants can take many forms, including changes involving only
a single nucleotide base pair, generally referred to as a single nucleo-
tide polymorphism (SNP).33  Alternatively, variants can be much
larger and can involve inserting, deleting, duplicating, translocating,
or inverting longer stretches of DNA.34
Genetic variants can have a wide range of meanings and signifi-
cance for an individual.  Some variants signal susceptibility to future
disease, including predispositions to breast cancer or diabetes.35
Some variants signal onset of genetic conditions likely to occur later in
life, such as Huntington’s disease.36  A third category of variants indi-
cates “carrier status”—someone who might pass along a potentially
disease-causing variant to offspring but who is unlikely themselves to
be affected by the disease.37  Variants might also code for nonmedical
physical traits such as eye color.38  Finally, DNA sequencing can un-
cover variants of unknown significance, the importance of which we do
not yet understand.39
Most genetic variants currently fall into this last category of un-
known significance.  As technologies for sequencing genetic material
increasingly allow for rapid sequencing of large amounts of DNA, our
technological capacity for discovering variants outpaces scientific un-
derstanding regarding their consequences for individuals.  Scientific
researchers, however, continue to explore the connections between ge-
28. See, e.g., id. at 109.
29. See, e.g., id. at 110.
30. See, e.g., id. at 113.
31. See, e.g., id.
32. See, e.g., id. at 112.  This also includes sequencing the subset of the protein-cod-
ing regions of the genome called exons that contain an estimated 85% of known
disease-causing mutations, a process known as whole exome sequencing. See,
e.g., id. at 116–17.
33. See, e.g., id. at 113–14.
34. See, e.g., id. at 114.
35. See, e.g., Greer Donley, Sara Chandros Hull & Benjamin E. Berkman, Prenatal
Whole Genome Sequencing: Just Because We Can, Should We?, 42 HASTINGS
CENTER REPORT 28, 32 (2012).
36. See, e.g., id.
37. See, e.g., id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 31.
39. See, e.g., id.
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netic variants and their corresponding physical manifestations,40 and
new associations are continuously published in the literature.
B. Origins and Evolution of Genetic Testing
At the start of the Human Genome Project in 1990,41 genetic tests
were available for only 100 specific disease-causing genes,42 and these
tests were generally only accessible by individuals through their clini-
cian.43  Since the completion of the Human Genome Project, the num-
ber of tests available has grown exponentially and the means by which
the public accesses these tests has evolved.  In 2007 (the advent of
DTC genetic testing), there were genetic tests for more than 1100 dis-
ease-causing variants (some with more supporting data than
others);44 by 2009, there were 1900;45 and as of April 2012, there were
discrete genetic tests existing for more than 2600 disease-causing var-
iants.46  These 2600 known variants, however, still represent but a
small fraction of variants possible in the genome’s three billion nucleo-
tide base pairs.47
40. See, e.g., PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 4, at 117.
41. The Human Genome Project, which began in 1990 and was coordinated by the
U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), was
founded to:
identify all the . . . genes in human DNA, determine the sequences of the
3 billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA, store this infor-
mation in databases, improve tools for data analysis, transfer related
technologies to the private sector, and address the ethical, legal, and so-
cial issues (ELSI) that may arise from the project.
Human Genome Project, HUMAN GENOME PROJECT INFORMATION, http://web.ornl.
gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/home.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
The project states that it achieved “catalyz[ing] the multibillion-dollar U.S. bio-
technology industry” and fostered the development of new medical applications.
It ended in 2003, but analysis of the data it produced continues. See id.
42. See Jessica Elizabeth Palmer, Genetic Gatekeepers: Regulating Direct-to-Con-
sumer Genomic Services in an Era of Participatory Medicine, 67 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 475, 479 (2012); Vicki Brower, FDA to Regulate Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Tests, 102 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1610, 1610 (2010); Felix F. Frueh, et al., The
Future of Direct-to-Consumer Clinical Genetic Tests, 12 NATURE REVIEW GENET-
ICS 511, 513–14  (2011); Arthur L. Beaudet & Gail Javitt, Which Way For Genetic-
Test Regulation?, 466 NATURE 816, 816 (2010).
43. See infra subsection II.B.2.
44. See, e.g., Kathy Hudson et al., ASHG Statement on Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing in the United States, 110 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1392, 1392 (2007).
45. See, e.g., Beaudet & Javitt, supra note 42, at 816.
46. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 42, at 480.
47. See, e.g., Catherine Gliwa & Benjamin E. Berkman, Do Researchers Have an Ob-
ligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 32,
36 (2013) (“Genomic science is still in its infancy, and the amount we know about
the relationship between genomic data and human disease is dwarfed by the
amount we do not yet know.”).
2014] CONSUMING GENOMICS 687
1. From Discrete Genetic Tests to Large-Scale Testing and
Genomic Sequencing
Early genetic tests were only capable of identifying mutations
within a single gene, such as those associated with Tay-Sachs disease
and cystic fibrosis.48  They were also only able to recognize genes with
high “penetrance”—in which the presence of a mutation gives rise to
an extremely high lifetime risk of contracting a disease, such as Hunt-
ington’s.49  Most currently identified variants, however, are signifi-
cantly less strongly associated with diseases such that some people
with the variant will never develop the associated disease (and those
who do develop the disease might experience a range of severity).50
Genetic tests are also increasingly helpful in identifying complex,
polygenic diseases associated with complicated environmental and
gene-gene interactions.51  Nineteen percent of laboratories responding
to a 2013 College of American Pathologists survey stated they were
already conducting “next-generation sequencing” (or large-scale se-
quencing) with more than half of the laboratories stating they planned
to begin using this type of testing within the next three years.52  De-
termination of genetic susceptibility to polygenic disease (having
many different genetic and environmental causes), however, is more
complex.53
Several important and unique attributes further distinguish large-
scale genetic testing and genomic sequencing from discrete genetic
testing.  First, because some large-scale testing and sequencing in-
volves a large portion of an individual’s nuclear DNA, the resulting
data are uniquely identifiable to one person.  Even if all other identify-
ing information is stripped from the data—preventing them from be-
ing “readily identifiable” to the user—the data are still unique to one
individual.54  In addition, marketers of discrete genetic tests advertise
48. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 42, at 1610.
49. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 42, at 479.
50. See, e.g., id.
51. Stephanie Bair, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: Learning from the Past and
Looking Toward the Future, 67 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 413, 416 (2012) (citing
MICHAEL WINK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MOLECULAR BIOTECHNOLOGY 456 (2006)).
52. Celia Henry Arnaud, Next Generation DNA Sequencing Finds Use As a Diagnos-
tic, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (July 15, 2013), http://cen.acs.org/articles/91/
i28/Next-Generation-DNA-Sequencing-Finds.html?h=-817242108.
53. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 51, at 416.
54. See, e.g., PRIVACY AND PROGRESS, supra note 4, at 83.  As preventive measures for
keeping genomic data anonymous continue to crumble, it is important for con-
sumers to keep in mind that their genomic sequence, stripped of traditional iden-
tifiers and available online, could possibly still be linked back to them, exposing
the consumer to increased privacy risk. See, e.g., Melissa Gymrek et al., Identify-
ing Personal Genomes by Surname Inference, 339 SCIENCE 321, 321–24 (2013)
(finding that surnames can be recovered from de-identified personal genomes
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them as being able to provide an answer to a specific question.55
Large-scale genetic testing and genomic sequencing, by contrast, pro-
duce substantially more data, and the medical significance of the ma-
jority of them is far more speculative if known at all.56
As genetic testing moves from discovering diseases and conditions
associated with variations within a single gene toward large-scale ge-
netic testing and genomic sequencing, researchers have also raised se-
rious concerns regarding whether and to what extent determinations
about genetic susceptibilities to complex, polygenic diseases are actu-
ally at all predictive.  One 2008 study found that “variants so far iden-
tified by [genome-wide association studies] together explain only a
small fraction of the overall inherited risk of each disease”; for exam-
ple, genetic susceptibility currently explains only five percent of the
inherited risk of Type 2 diabetes.57  Another study found that of the
eighteen genetic variants linked to Type 2 diabetes, none gave a better
risk estimate than one simply based on an individual’s body mass in-
dex, age, and sex.58  It also found that the two most closely associated
genetic variants were worse at predicting cholesterol drug response
than knowing an individual’s age and sex.59 This type of empirical
analysis led one researcher recently to conclude that “currently known
variants explain too little about the risk of disease occurrence to be of
clinically useful predictive value.”60
This transition from genetic testing to large-scale testing and geno-
mic sequencing is not just a difference in degree—it is a difference in
kind.  And this more expansive testing might eventually cost little
more than doing discrete tests for single genes.  Accordingly, we are
moving into an era in which large-scale genetic testing is increasingly
likely to be the process through which researchers, clinicians, and
DTC companies investigate genetic material.61
available on free, publicly accessible Internet sites by profiling short tandem re-
peats from recreational genetic genealogy databases).
55. See, e.g., Does Breast or Ovarian Cancer Run in Your Family?, MYRIAD, http://
www.bracnow.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (“[K]now your risk for hereditary
breast and ovarian cancer . . . by identifying a BRCA gene mutation.”).
56. Donley, Hull & Berkman, supra note 35, at 32.
57. David Altshuler et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCIENCE 881, 881
(2008).
58. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 482 (citing Clifton Bogardus, Missing Heritability
and GWAS Utility, 17 OBESITY 209, 210 (2009)).
59. See id.
60. Teri A. Manolio, Genomewide Association Studies and Assessment of the Risk of
Disease, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 166, 173 (2010).
61. See Palmer, supra note 42.
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2. From Clinician-Provided Testing to Direct-to-Consumer
Access
When DTC companies 23andMe and deCODEme launched in 2007,
genetic testing became available without the use of a clinician inter-
mediary.62  In 2008, Knome (pronounced “know-me”) became the first
company to offer DTC genomic sequencing and interpretation—for the
introductory price of $350,000 a person.63  While the particulars of
each DTC genetic-testing service vary, the broad contours are gener-
ally the same: DTC companies typically advertise and operate over the
Internet; a consumer orders the test and receives a sample collection
kit; and the consumer takes a cheek swab or saliva sample, returns it,
and then awaits a report of the results by mail or online.64  If the com-
pany provides genetic counseling, it is usually available to the con-
sumer after they have purchased the service65 for an additional fee.66
Genetic companies offer DTC tests for educational,67 paternity, or
ancestry purposes, or merely to satisfy the curiosity of the customer.68
Tests can predict traits as mundane as excessive earwax; carrier sta-
tus for severe diseases like cystic fibrosis; the probability of developing
disease in the future, such as breast cancer or Alzheimer’s disease; or
the ability to metabolize certain drugs, such as Warfarin (a blood thin-
ner).69  In 2007, 23andMe began by offering thirteen reports on
62. See, e.g., Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1392.
63. See Amy Harmon, Gene Map Becomes a Luxury Item, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at
F1.  Knome no longer offers this service.  In 2010 Knome decided to move away
from working with the “wealthy healthy” and changed their model to focus on
Knome’s technology and technological expertise.  It currently markets to medical
institutions, researchers, and pharmaceutical companies.  As Knome’s chief mar-
keting officer put it: “The model changed as sequencing changed.”  Malorye Al-
lison, Direct-to-Consumer Genomics Reinvents Itself, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
1027, 1028 (2012).  Illumina currently markets genomic sequencing directly to
consumers; however, its test requires a physician order.  It recommends that po-
tential customers “discuss [their] interest with a physician who can lead [them]
through the process, know what genetic information [they] are seeking, and
consider what additional information [they] may, or may not, want to learn based
on [their] genome sequence.” See Individual Genome Sequencing (IGS) for Pa-
tients/Guardians, ILLUMINA, http://www.illumina.com/clinical/illumina_clinical_
laboratory/igs_for_patients.ilmn#3a (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
64. See, e.g., Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1393.
65. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 51, at 418.
66. Understanding Your Results: How Do I Find a Medical Genetics Specialist?,
23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/entries/21259247-How-do-I-find-a-
medical-genetics-specialist- (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
67. See, e.g., Brower, supra note 42, at 1611.
68. See, e.g., Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1392.
69. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 51, at 414–15; Amy L. McGuire et al., Regulating Di-
rect-to-Consumer Personal Genome Testing, 330 SCIENCE 181, 181 (2010);
Beaudet & Javitt, supra note 42, at 817–18.
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health-related conditions or traits for $999.70  Through November
2013, 23andMe offered more than 250 reports, including reports on
breast and cervical cancer, cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs Disease, and ear-
wax type, for $99.71
A few years ago, nearly thirty DTC companies offered 400 discrete
genetic tests.72  Over the past several years, due in part to increasing
state and federal regulatory scrutiny, a number of formerly DTC com-
panies—including Navigenics, Pathway Genomics, Counsyl, and Il-
lumina—shifted to a prescription-based model,73 and 23andMe has—
at least temporarily—discontinued its health-related product.74
C. Concerns Raised by Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
DTC genetic testing can offer individuals the possibility of more
genetic information than has ever before been available without the
involvement of a healthcare professional or “learned intermediary.”75
Some see the benefits of granting “unfettered access to genetic infor-
mation”76 as including greater consumer autonomy and empower-
ment,77 enhanced control over (or privacy of) the information
70. JOANNA MOUNTAIN, INCIDENTAL FINDINGS: A 23ANDME PERSPECTIVE, PRESENTA-
TION TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES 9
(Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/Meeting%2013
%20Session%206%20TRANSCRIPT.pdf; Lisa Baertlein, Google-backed 23andMe
Offers $999 DNA Test, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2007-11-20-23andme-launch_N.htm.
71. See Living Well Starts with Knowing Your DNA, 23ANDME, https://www.
23andme.com/health (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (this Web page has since been
taken down in response to FDA’s November 22, 2013 Warning Letter to
23andMe); What You Can Expect, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/health/
all/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (this Web page has since been taken down in re-
sponse to FDA’s November 22, 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe) [hereinafter
23ANDME—Health Reports]; Testing for Common Mutations, 23ANDME, https://
www.23andme.com/health/risks/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013) (this Web page has
since been taken down in response to FDA’s November 22, 2013 Warning Letter
to 23andMe).
72. See, e.g., Beaudet & Javitt, supra note 42, at 817–18.
73. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 42, at 484–85.
74. See Welcome to 23andMe, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/ancestry-only-no-
tice/?redirect=bsd1eHc63cDhvlgL8Wrzqwh8stpIXgZXQHoEN6hKzTo= (last vis-
ited Dec. 22, 2013).  As FDA does not regulate DTC services that provide only
nonhealth information, such as ancestry services, this Article will focus on DTC
companies providing medical claims only.
75. Under the “learned intermediary” rule in tort law, a manufacturer is not liable to
an injured patient or consumer if a physician prescribed the use of the product or
if it was used under the physician’s supervision and the manufacturer adequately
warned the physician of any potential harms.  Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six
Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Norplant Case and the Applicability
of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to Direct-to-Consumer Drug Promotion, 55
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 525 (2000).
76. Brower, supra note 42, at 1612.
77. See, e.g., Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1392.
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obtained,78 and the possibility of motivating improved health behav-
iors.79  Others worry about the negative effects this access might
have.  Several scholars argue that DTC marketing confuses consum-
ers because it “(1) fails to adequately explain complex genetic informa-
tion; (2) is misleading in its failure to disclose the risks and limitations
of testing; (3) allows tests without established clinical validity or util-
ity to be promoted; and (4) does not include the counseling needed to
put test results in proper context.”80
Some have also expressed concern that “consumers will choose
testing without adequate context or counseling, will receive tests from
laboratories of dubious quality, and will be misled by unproven claims
of benefit.”81  The risks include “psychological distress and misunder-
standing of actual risks, leading to either false reassurance or the pos-
sibility of unnecessary medical procedures.”82  A consumer falsely
reassured by positive information—for example, a decreased risk of
heroin addiction (a test that was performed by 23andMe)83—might
mistakenly assume that they would not become addicted to the
drug.84  Consumers also might not understand the limits of particular
tests and might expect a service to be more comprehensive than it is—
for example, they might not have realized that 23andMe based its
breast cancer risk information on the analysis of only three of dozens
of variants associated with breast cancer.85  Ultimately, many have
expressed concern that “consumers may make unwarranted, and even
irrevocable, decisions on the basis of test results and associated infor-
mation, such as the decision to terminate a pregnancy, to forgo needed
treatment, or to pursue unproven therapies.”86
78. See, e.g., id.
79. See Frueh et al., supra note 42, at 511.
80. Gail H. Javitt et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, Government Oversight,
and the First Amendment: What the Government Can (and Can’t) Do to Protect
the Public’s Health, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 251, 253 (2004).
81. Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1392.
82. Frueh et al., supra note 42, at 511.
83. Heroin Addiction, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/health/Heroin-Addiction/
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (this Web page has since been taken down in response
to FDA’s November 22, 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe).
84. See, e.g., Bair, supra note 51, at 422.
85. See, e.g., Palmer, supra note 42, at 489.  The limitations on 23andMe’s breast
cancer testing, however, are readily available on their website. BRCA Cancer
Mutations (Selected), 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/health/BRCA-Cancer/
(last visited Nov. 11, 2013) (this Web page has since been taken down in response
to FDA’s November 22, 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe) (“Please remember
that the BRCA mutations covered by this report are only three of hundreds in the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes that can cause cancer. Their absence does not rule out
the possibility that you may have another cancer-causing variation in one of
those genes.”).
86. Hudson et al., supra note 44, at 1393–94. But see Palmer, supra note 42, at 518
(“But concerns about prophylactic ovary removal or mastectomies seem far-
692 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:677
Taking into account these potential concerns, there is little empiri-
cal data supporting either the lauding or condemning of the indus-
try.87  In past studies, consumers participating in DTC genetic testing
did not score high in signs of stress or distress.88  People generally
appear to be motivated to make positive health improvements after
learning about their DTC genetic information.89  But possible benefits
and criticisms of DTC genetic testing have been discussed at length in
the published literature, and the GAO and high-level advisory com-
mittees have weighed in with their concerns and hopes for DTC ge-
netic testing.  These reports raise serious concerns about the quality of
the results offered by DTC companies—laying the groundwork for
other agencies to become more involved in regulating DTC genetic
testing, discussed more thoroughly in Part III of this Article.
1. Investigation by the Government Accountability Office in 2006
The GAO first investigated the legitimacy of DTC genetic tests and
claims made regarding genetically determined health risks in 2006.90
In so doing, GAO staff members posed as consumers and submitted
twelve samples from one female and another two samples from an un-
fetched: for one thing, women could not unilaterally take those actions without a
physician, so a gatekeeper would be involved regardless.”).
87. See, e.g., Frueh et al., supra note 42, at 511 (“There is considerable speculation,
but little data, about the benefits and harms of DTC testing.”); McGuire et al.,
supra note 69, at 181.
88. See, e.g., Frueh et al., supra note 42, at 511 (“Distress appears uncommon . . . .”);
Bair, supra note 51, at 421 (“An empirical study performed by Cinnamon Bloss
and colleagues found that consumers undergoing DTC genetic testing did not
score significantly higher on stress-related indicators upon learning that they
were at increased risk for a particular disease such as heart disease or cancer.”);
Palmer, supra note 42, at 488 (“[R]ecent studies have found no evidence to sup-
port consumer distress resulting from DTC testing.”).
89. See, e.g., Frueh et al., supra note 42, at 512 (“The Scripps Genomic Health Initia-
tive, an ongoing 20-year study to assess the behavioural impact of personal ge-
netic testing, has found a positive correlation between disease susceptibility risk
as revealed by the tests and consumers’ intent to be screened with medical tests,
such as mammograms and colonoscopies.”); id. at 511 (“Thus far, there is little
evidence that health behaviours or health outcomes are improved. . . . [B]ut there
is evidence that genetic risk information may be utilized to guide non-medical
decisions.”); McGuire et al., supra note 69, at 181 (“In one study, 40% of partici-
pants with genetic test results indicating increased risk for Alzheimer’s disease
reported increasing their use of medications or vitamins, compared with 20% of
those whose results did not indicate increased risk.”); Palmer, supra note 42, at
492 (“[S]peculative fears are countered by evidence suggesting that predictive ge-
netic testing motivates individuals to engage in healthy behavior and plan for the
future.”).
90. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-977T, NUTRIGENIC TESTING: TESTS
PURCHASED FROM FOUR WEB SITES MISLED CONSUMERS, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
S. SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d06977t.pdf [hereinafter GAO—2006].
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related male for analysis.91  GAO described these samples as coming
from adults of various ages, weights, and lifestyles.92  It concluded
that the four DTC genetic-testing companies it investigated provided
results that were so vague as to be virtually useless.93
The recommendations produced by the DTC companies also ap-
peared to be more responsive to the results provided in a lifestyle sur-
vey rather than to the genetic analysis itself.  For example, if a
lifestyle description indicated that a person was a smoker, he or she
received advice to stop smoking.94  Test results from the same genetic
sample should have resulted in similar recommendations—instead,
the recommendations were inconsistent and varied in accordance with
the different information that was included in the lifestyle
description.95
The investigation also raised concerns about quality control.  For
example, one DTC company’s laboratory was not approved under the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA) (discussed in
more detail in section III.C).96  Another DTC company recommended
expensive dietary supplements, estimated to cost $1,200 per year, that
were found to be “substantially the same as typical multivitamins that
can be found in any grocery store for about $35 per year.”97  In re-
sponse to this investigation, FDA, the U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (CDC), and FTC warned consumers to be wary of
claims made by DTC genetic-testing companies in a public consumer
alert.98
2. Reports of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics,
Health, and Society
The Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health, and So-
ciety (Advisory Committee) was chartered in 2002 by then-Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) Tommy Thompson “as a public
91. Id. at 2–3.
92. Id.
93. For example, one company informed consumers that they “may” be “at increased
risk” for developing heart disease. Id. at 8.
94. Id. at 6 (“Even if the predictions could be medically proven, the way the results
are presented renders them meaningless.”).
95. Id.
96. CLIA was passed in 1988 to establish quality standards for laboratory testing “to
ensure the accuracy, reliability and timeliness” of test results. Id. at 1. See also
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/medical
devices/deviceregulationandguidance/ivdregulatoryassistance/ucm124105.htm
(last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (“Congress passed [CLIA] . . . to ensure the accuracy,
reliability and timeliness of patient test results.”).
97. GAO—2006, supra note 90, at 5–6.
98. Consumer Information: At Home Genetic Tests, U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0166-home-genetic-tests (last visited Oct. 17,
2013) [hereinafter FTC—Consumer Alert].
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forum for deliberation on the broad range of policy issues raised by the
development and use of genetic tests.”99  The Advisory Committee ex-
pressed concerns about genetic testing generally, and DTC testing in
particular, in a series of reports.
In the first of these reports, U.S. System of Oversight of Genetic
Testing: A Response to the Charge of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services issued in April 2008, the Advisory Committee was
tasked with “investigating specific questions related to the adequacy
and transparency of the current oversight system for genetic test-
ing.”100  It recognized that the “responsibilities for the oversight of ge-
netic testing are shared by multiple governmental and
nongovernmental bodies,” including, at the federal level, FDA and
CMS (discussed further in Part III of this Article).101
In its analysis, the Advisory Committee identified gaps related to
the oversight of genetic testing in five main areas: (1) the regulations
governing clinical laboratory quality; (2) oversight of the clinical valid-
ity of genetic tests; (3) the transparency of genetic testing; (4) the level
of current knowledge about the clinical usefulness of genetic tests; and
(5) the educational needs of “health professionals, the public health
community, patients, and consumers.”102  In response, the Advisory
Committee proposed several action-guiding recommendations, includ-
ing that:
• CMS require proficiency testing under CLIA (a process by
which a laboratory’s genetic tests are compared to and mea-
sured against an established, external standard);
• FDA address concerns about clinical validity in all laboratory
tests “regardless of how they are produced . . . .” (discussed fur-
ther in Part III of this Article);103
• HHS appoint and fund a lead agency to develop a “mandatory,
publicly available, Web-based registry for laboratory tests;”104
and
• Public health surveillance and other mechanisms be used in as-
sessing the clinical utility of genetic tests.105
99. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., U.S. SYSTEM OF OVERSIGHT OF GENETIC TESTING: A RESPONSE TO
THE CHARGE OF THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 2008),
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/SACGHS/reports/SACGHS_oversight_re-
port.pdf [hereinafter SACGHS—2008].
100. Letter from Steven Teutsch, M.D., Current Chair, SACGHS, & Reed V. Tuckson,
M.D., Former Chair, SACGHS, to The Hon. Michael O. Leavitt, Sec’y, Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs. (Apr. 30, 2018), in SACGHS—2008, supra note 99.
101. SACGHS—2008, supra note 99, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.
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In a subsequent report focused specifically on DTC genetic testing
released in April 2010,106 the Advisory Committee identified gaps in
four areas that limit “the ability of consumers to make informed deci-
sions about DTC genetic testing services . . . .”107  The gaps that the
Advisory Committee identified included: (1) federal oversight of DTC
testing, specifically the lack of review by FDA and FTC of genetic-test-
ing claims and promotional materials made by DTC genetic-testing
companies; (2) the evidence of clinical validity and utility for most
DTC genetic tests; (3) privacy and research protections for consumers
using DTC genetic services given the potentially limited applicability
of federal laws and inadequacy of state law protections; and (4) inade-
quate knowledge of DTC testing by healthcare providers who are
asked about it by their patients.108  Although the Advisory Committee
recognized that deficiencies exist in the delivery and oversight of
clinical genetic testing, it nevertheless wanted “to ensure that stan-
dards for DTC genetic tests harmonize with standards for provider-
based genetic tests.”109
As in its previous report, the Advisory Committee provided a num-
ber of action-guiding recommendations, including that:
• FDA and CMS “should develop the necessary guidance and/or
regulations that close gaps in the oversight” of DTC genetic
testing;
• HHS and FTC should establish a task force to provide the nec-
essary expertise to “develop guidelines to use as a basis to eval-
uate claims made by companies providing DTC genetic
services;” and
• Various HHS agencies should identify the specific gaps in state
and federal research and privacy protections for information
generated through DTC genetic testing and develop strategies
to address those gaps.110
106. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GENETIC TESTING (Apr. 2010), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHS_DTC_Report_2010.pdf [here-
inafter SACGHS—2010].
107. Letter from Steven Teutsch, M.D., Current Chair, SACGHS, to The Hon. Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (Apr. 28, 2010), in
SACGHS—2010, supra note 106.
108. SACGHS—2008, supra note 99.
109. Id. at 3.
110. The Advisory Committee also recognized several areas concerning DTC testing
that were ripe for future study including: the extent to which DTC services are
being used for surreptitious genetic testing, the implications of DTC genetic test-
ing for children, the psychosocial impact of DTC genetic testing, research use of
specimens and data obtained through DTC genetic testing, the impact of DTC
genetic testing on the health care system, and the potential for DTC services to
exacerbate health disparities.  SACGHS—2010, supra note 106.  A third topical
SACGHS report, Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Pa-
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3. Investigation by the Government Accountability Office in 2010
Despite GAO’s 2006 investigation and the concerns voiced by the
Advisory Committee, DTC genetic-testing companies continued to
build public trust and attention.  For example, the “retail DNA test”
with a profile of 23andMe won Time magazine’s “invention of the year”
in 2008.111  GAO, however, noted that “experts remain concerned that
the test results mislead consumers” and in 2010 once again launched
an investigation of the legitimacy of DTC genetic testing.112  It found
the new results of DTC companies to be just as troubling as the results
from the previous investigation.113  GAO purchased ten DTC genetic
tests each from four companies, selected five donors, and sent two
samples from each: one with accurate lifestyle information and one
with fictionalized information, including age, race, and/or ethnicity
data.114  The same donors ended up receiving “disease risk predictions
that varied across the four companies, indicating that identical DNA
samples yield contradictory results,” and “DNA-based disease predic-
tions that conflicted with their actual medical conditions.”115  The
DTC companies also provided only incomplete results to these fiction-
alized African- or Asian-American donors due to the companies’ lim-
ited data sets on participants with similar heritages, but they did not
disclose this limitation to consumers prior to purchase.116
Two of the companies also sold consumers supplements marketed
to “repair damaged DNA,” a claim experts dismissed as having no sci-
entific basis.117  Some told consumers that they could predict at which
sports the consumers’ children would excel—a claim one expert dis-
missed as “complete garbage.”118  Despite the fact that surreptitious
genetic testing is restricted in thirty-three states, one company
spokesperson told a consumer that she could surprise her fiance´ with
tient Access to Genetic Tests, also released in April 2010, is discussed in more
detail in Part III of this Article. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS,
HEALTH, & SOC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GENE PATENTS AND
LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS
(Apr. 2010), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/sacghs_patents_
report_2010.pdf [hereinafter SACGHS—GENE PATENTS].
111. Anita Hamilton, Best Inventions of 2008, TIME, Oct. 29, 2008, http://content.time.
com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1852747_1854493_1854113,00.html.
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-847T, DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER GE-
NETIC TESTS: MISLEADING RESULTS ARE FURTHER COMPLICATED BY DECEPTIVE
MARKETING AND OTHER QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES (July 22, 2010) (statement of
Gregory Kutz, Managing Dir., Forensic Audits & Special Investigations), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/125079.pdf [hereinafter GAO TESTIMONY].
113. GAO TESTIMONY, supra note 112.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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a genetic test conducted secretly.119  Last, one company spokesperson
informed a consumer “that an above average risk prediction for breast
cancer meant she was ‘in the high risk of pretty much getting’ the
disease.”120
Once again, GAO concluded that there was much work to be done
before DTC genetic tests could be considered as valid and clinically
useful as consumers expected them to be.121
***
While genetic testing holds out tremendous promise in under-
standing the causes—and potential cures—of disease, there is still
much to be learned regarding the interpretation of this information.
Genetic testing has progressed rapidly from targeted tests of single
genes highly associated with diseases to more complicated genome-
wide analyses and large-scale testing, allowing consumers to explore
their genetic data and interpreted medical information more
broadly.122  But this movement toward large-scale genetic testing and
genomic sequencing brings with it attendant concerns about the inter-
pretation of complex information by non-expert consumers, as well as
the actual validity and utility of the information.  As discussed in Part
III of this Article, this evolution presents many unique challenges for
agencies tasked with regulating DTC testing.
III. REGULATING DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
GENETIC TESTING
Many federal agencies are involved in regulating DTC genetic test-
ing, attempting to ensure valid and useful genetic data and informa-
tion for the public.  Part III of this Article examines the various
agencies that have jurisdiction over DTC testing and concludes that
although several agencies have the capacity to regulate the DTC ge-
netic-testing industry, parameters and limitations might stymie their
ability to fully ensure the accuracy and reliability of DTC genetic
testing.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See GAO TESTIMONY, supra note 112, at 1–2.  Of note, a much more recent article
appearing in the New York Times purported to conduct the same type of in-
quiry—comparing the medical results of 23andMe, Genetic Testing Laboratories,
and Pathway Genomics for the same single consumer—and alleging that the “dis-
crepancies were striking.” See Kira Peikoff, I Had My DNA Picture Taken, with
Varying Results, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2013, at D1.
122. See, e.g., How It Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/ (last
visited Nov. 3, 2013).
698 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:677
A. Food and Drug Administration: Regulation of Medical
Devices and Engagement with the Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic-Testing Industry
FDA has the jurisdiction to regulate DTC genetic tests as medical
devices and plays the largest role in their oversight.123  Although FDA
considers genetic tests to be in vitro diagnostic devices (medical de-
vices intended to perform diagnoses in a controlled environment
outside a living organism),124 it does not consider them to fall under
the laboratory developed test exemption (an exemption for a subset of
in vitro diagnostic devices that FDA allows to enter the market with-
out prior approval).125  Although FDA traditionally exercised enforce-
ment discretion over DTC genetic testing,126 it recently strengthened
its supervision of devices labeled for research or investigational use
only, which had been another unregulated aspect of genetic tests.127
After a respite of enforcement discretion, FDA began direct engage-
ment with the DTC industry in 2010 with potential violation notifica-
tions,128 culminating with an official warning to the final major player
standing (23andMe) in November 2013.129  The sections that follow
123. 21 U.S.C § 321(h) (2006).
124. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2013).
125. See, e.g., Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Ph.D., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic De-
vice Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Device & Radiological Health, to Jorge Conde,
Co-Founder & CEO, Knome, Inc. (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/medicaldevices/resourcesforyou/industry/ucm215239.pdf [herein-
after Letter from Gutierrez to Conde]; Peter Barton Hutt, A Brief History of the
Regulation of In Vitro Diagnostic Products, in IN VITRO DIAGNOSTICS: THE COM-
PLETE REGULATORY GUIDE, 1, 6 (Scott D. Danzis & Ellen J. Flannery eds., 2010).
126. See Medical Devices; Classification/Reclassification; Restricted Devices; Analyte
Specific Reagents, 62 Fed. Reg. 62,243, 62,243 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter Clas-
sification/Reclassification] (“The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is issuing
a final rule to classify/reclassify analyte specific reagents (ASR’s) presenting a
low risk to public health into class I (general controls), and to exempt these class
I devices from the premarket notification (510(k)) requirements.”).  FDA had orig-
inally planned to regulate laboratory developed tests, however, after pressure
from industry, it instead decided to regulate the “analyte specific reagents” used
in the laboratory developed tests.  Palmer, supra note 42, at 499.
127. FDA expressed concern that the “[u]se of such tests for clinical diagnostic pur-
poses may mislead healthcare providers and cause serious adverse health conse-
quences to patients, who are not aware that they are being diagnosed with
research or investigational products.” FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF, COMMERCIALLY DISTRIBUTED IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC
PRODUCTS LABELED FOR RESEARCH USE ONLY OR INVESTIGATIONAL USE ONLY: FRE-
QUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5–6 (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
UCM257460.pdf [hereinafter FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY]; see 21 C.F.R.
§ 809.10(c) (2013).
128. Letter to Plante, supra note 14.
129. See Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
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further expand upon this regulatory analysis and set forth four impor-
tant insights for the industry.
1. Food and Drug Administration’s Regulation of Medical
Devices
FDA is tasked with protecting the public’s health by assuring the
“safety, effectiveness, and security” of myriad medical interven-
tions.130  The Food and Drugs Act of 1906 provided the original grant
of FDA authority.131  The act was amended in 1938, expanding FDA
jurisdiction to include medical devices,132 currently defined as any “in-
strument, apparatus, implement, machine, in vitro reagent, or similar
or related article . . . which is . . . intended for use in the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease.”133  FDA regulates companies who “manufac-
ture, repackage, relabel, and/or import” medical devices sold in the
United States.134
FDA classifies medical devices into three categories—Class I, II, or
III—on the basis of risk to the consumer.135  The greater the risk to
the consumer, the more control perceived necessary to ensure the
safety and effectiveness of the device, and the higher the classification
it receives.136  Devices that are not intended to help support or sustain
life or that are not substantially important in preventing impairment
to human health (and that do not present an unreasonable risk of ill-
ness or injury) are classified as Class I.  Class I devices include exam
gloves, adhesive bandages, and toothbrushes.  Class II devices are de-
signed to perform as indicated without causing injury or harm to the
user and include mercury thermometers, powered wheelchairs, and
surgical drapes.  Class III devices are those that support or sustain
130. FDA Fundamentals, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/
ucm192695.htm (last updated May 6, 2013).
131. Hutt, supra note 125, at 1.
132. FDA immediately noticed the limitations of the 1906 legislation regarding lack of
control over “fraudulent medical devices.” Id. (citing C.L. Alsberg, Report of the
Chemist, in ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOR THE YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1917 at 199, 214 (1918)).  In fact, this was one of the major goals
of the 1933 revision.  When the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act was amended again
later in the wake of the thalidomide disaster of 1963, the medical device portions
were not substantively updated.  Hutt, supra note 125, at 1.
133. 21 U.S.C § 321(h) (2006).
134. Overview of Device Regulation, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/overview/default.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 2013).  Spe-
cifically, the Center for Devices and Radiological Health regulates the device in-
dustry. Id.
135. Classify your medical device, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Device
RegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last updated
Dec. 3, 2012) [hereinafter FDA—Classify Your Device].
136. See id.
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human life; are of substantial importance in preventing impairment of
human health; or present a potential, unreasonable risk of illness or
injury (or for which there is insufficient information to make such a
determination).137  Class III devices include items such as defibril-
lator machines, replacement heart valves, and silicone breast
implants.138
Classification dictates the level of engagement companies must
have with FDA before being able to legally market and sell their de-
vices in the United States.  As FDA presumes Class I devices pose
minimal potential for harm, they are only subject to “General Con-
trols” including:
• Registration of manufacturers, distributors, repackages, and
re-labelers;
• Listing products and activities with FDA;
• Manufacturing according to Good Manufacturing Practices (de-
lineating, for example, design controls, identification and trace-
ability requirements, and handling instructions);139 and
• Labeling requirements (such as intended use, adequate direc-
tions, and a prohibition against false or misleading
statements).140
Class II devices are subject to the above General Controls, as well
as Special Controls adding stricter labeling requirements, perform-
ance standards, and/or postmarket surveillance.141  Most Class II de-
vices must submit a premarket notification (510(k)) before
marketing.142  In that notification, the manufacturer must demon-
strate that the device is at least as safe and effective, i.e. “substan-
tially equivalent,” to another device already being legally marketed.
FDA will accept the new device as substantially equivalent if it has
the same intended use and technological characteristics of a device
already on the market or has the same intended use, does not raise
new questions of safety and effectiveness, and is at least as safe and
137. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., INFORMATION SHEET GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVES-
TIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT MEDICAL DE-
VICES 2 (Jan. 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Regulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM127067.pdf; Regulatory Controls, FDA, http://www.
fda . gov / MedicalDevices / DeviceRegulationandGuidance / Overview / Generaland
SpecialControls/default.htm (last updated Apr. 11, 2013) [hereinafter FDA—
Controls].
138. Id.
139. 21 C.F.R. § 820 (2013).
140. 21 C.F.R § 801 (2013).  Technically, submission of a premarket notification
(510(k)) before marketing the device is a general control as well; however, most
Class I devices are exempt from this requirement. Class I/II Exemptions, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/
ClassifyYourDevice/ucm051549.htm (last updated Dec. 5, 2012).
141. See FDA—Controls, supra note 137.
142. 21 C.F.R § 807 (2013).
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effective.143   In 2003, when FDA began clearing discrete genetic tests,
it generally did so through its Class II 510(k) notification process.144
FDA created the de novo 510(k) review process to alleviate an im-
balance in the classification system just described.  Before the de novo
process, novel and unique devices could not be cleared by the “sub-
stantially equivalent” test even if they gave rise to less risk than a
traditional Class III device.  FDA therefore released guidance in 2011
to establish a de novo program designed to allow low- to moderate-risk
devices on the market even without substantially equivalent predicate
devices,145 which is the process it used in several cases to consider
genetic tests.146
143. Premarket Notification (510K), FDA, http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/device
regulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/
premarketnotification510k/default.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2010).
144. Gail H. Javitt, In Search of a Coherent Framework: Options for FDA Oversight of
Genetic Tests, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 617, 628 (2007).  There are several limita-
tions to the premarket clearance process pertinent to the genetic-testing indus-
try.  For example, premarket clearance applications typically require data
supporting analytical validity but do not require data about clinical validity.  The
Advisory Committee argued that, for the genetic-testing industry, the production
of genetic data is more straightforward than the interpretation and analysis re-
quired to generate patient-specific medical information, and FDA’s lack of focus
on clinical validity gives rise to a potential gap needed to ensure the accuracy and
validity of genetic interpretation services.  Regulating clinical validity, however,
faces several critical challenges in part because data associating genetic se-
quences with disease “are often unavailable or incomplete for years after a test is
developed, especially for predictive or presymptomatic tests.”  SACGHS—2008,
supra note 99, at 4.
145. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF, DE
NOVO CLASSIFICATION PROCESS (EVALUATION OF AUTOMATIC CLASS III DESIGNA-
TION) 3 (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/
DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM273903.pdf [hereinaf-
ter FDA—DE NOVO CLASSIFICATION] (“FDA believes that the process could be im-
proved and greater clarity could be provided regarding suitability and data
needed so that the de novo process may be a more viable pathway for novel low to
moderate risk devices.”).  In addition to the devices themselves, FDA regulates
the labeling of all devices and the advertising of prescription devices.  Under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a label is defined as a “display of written, printed,
or graphic matter upon the immediate container of any article” and labeling as
“all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter upon any article or any of
its containers or wrappers, or accompanying such article.”  21 U.S.C. §§ 321(k),
(m) (2006).  The term “accompanying” has been broadly interpreted by the Su-
preme Court not to require an actual physical association with the device at issue
but to include things such as brochures, letters, films, or recordings disseminated
by the manufacturer.  Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349–50 (1948); 21
C.F.R. § 202.1(a)–(b) (2013).  “Advertising” is defined in regulations as publica-
tions in journals, magazines, newspapers, and broadcasts; most advertising is,
however, considered to be a subset of labeling.  21 C.F.R. § 202.1(a)(1) (2013);
United States v. Research Laboratories, Inc., 126 F.2d 42, 45 (7th Cir. 1942).
146. See, e.g., 23andMe, @23andMe, TWITTER (July 30, 2012, 4:07 PM), https://twitter.
com/23andMe/status/230077137040842754 [hereinafter 23andMe—TWITTER].
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Most Class III devices require “premarket approval,” a rigorous
premarket review during which manufacturers must demonstrate
that their device is safe and clinically valid.  The Secretary of HHS
may restrict that device to only be sold, distributed, or used “upon the
[written or oral] authorization of a practitioner licensed by law to ad-
minister or use such device” if FDA determines that there cannot oth-
erwise be reasonable assurance of the device’s safety and
effectiveness.147
2. Exemptions for Genetic Tests Under In Vitro Diagnostic
Device Regulations
The definition of a medical device was expanded in 1976 to include
in vitro diagnostic devices,148 which generally are diagnostic test kits
used by a clinical laboratory.149  FDA considers genetic tests to be in
vitro diagnostic devices because they fall within the FDA’s definition
of in vitro devices as they are “reagents, instruments, and systems
intended for use in diagnosis of disease or other conditions, including
a determination of the state of health, in order to cure, mitigate, treat,
or prevent disease or its sequelae” and “intended for use in the collec-
tion, preparation, and examination of specimens taken from the
human body.”150
When FDA originally promulgated regulations for in vitro diagnos-
tic products, it exempted those intended and labeled for research or
investigational use only.151  FDA’s stated goal was to encourage and
protect products “intended for use in discovering and developing novel
and fundamental medical knowledge.”152  However, scholars argue,
FDA soon became concerned about the overwhelming use of this
exemption.153
A “laboratory developed test” is another type of in vitro diagnostic
device that a single laboratory manufactures and offers—as opposed
to diagnostic tests that require the expertise of several laboratories
working together.  It is sometimes also known as a “home brew
147. Marketing or Medicine: Are Direct-to-Consumer Medical Device Ads Playing Doc-
tor?: Hearing Before the S. Special Comm. on Aging, 110th Cong. 62 (Sept. 17,
2008) (statement of Daniel Schultz, Director, Center for Devices & Radiological
Health, Food & Drug Administration), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CHRG-110shrg49768/pdf/CHRG-110shrg49768.pdf.
148. Hutt, supra note 125, at 5–6.
149. The Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety, Under the Center
for Devices and Radiological Health within the FDA, is responsible for their regu-
lation. Id. at 6.
150. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009).
151. 21 C.F.R. § 809.10(c) (2009).
152. FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY, supra note 127, at 8.
153. See, e.g., Hutt, supra note 125, at 8.
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test.”154  Although laboratory developed tests are considered medical
devices, FDA has stated in the past that it would exercise enforcement
discretion over them,155 as they were generally “either well-character-
ized, low-risk diagnostics or for rare diseases for which adequate vali-
dation would not be feasible and the tests were being used to serve the
needs of the local patient population.”156
Genetic-testing companies that produce their own genetic data and
conduct their own analyses have, in the past, fallen under the labora-
tory developed test “home brew” exemption.157  However (as discussed
in subsection II.C.2 of this Article), the Advisory Committee recom-
mended that FDA address concerns about clinical validity in all labo-
ratory tests regardless of whether they were a commercial test kit or a
laboratory developed test.158
In 2010, FDA stated that it had reconsidered its position regarding
non-enforcement of laboratory developed tests, reasoning that the in-
dustry was shifting toward using component parts that were not indi-
vidually regulated and were being used to assess high-risk diseases
and direct treatments.  In addition, an increasing number of labora-
tory developed test manufacturers were corporations—as opposed to
the hospitals or public laboratories for which FDA originally carved
out the exemption.  Recently, FDA expressed concern that laboratory
developed tests that have not been appropriately validated put pa-
tients at risk for “missed diagnosis, wrong diagnosis, and failure to
154. See id. at 6.
155. See Classification/Reclassification, supra note 126 (“[FDA] is issuing a final rule
to classify/reclassify analyte specific reagents presenting a low risk to public
health into class I (general controls), and to exempt these class I devices from the
premarket notification (510(k)) requirements.”).
156. FDA/CDRH Public Meeting: Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests (LDTs),
FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/
ucm212830.htm# (last updated Sept. 17, 2010).
157. Hutt, supra note 125, at 10.  FDA began to narrow this home-brew exemption in
the late 2000s, beginning with exempting in vitro diagnostic multivariate assays
(which typically involve complex software analysis). See generally FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, CLINICAL LABORATORIES, AND FDA
STAFF, IN VITRO DIAGNOSTIC MULTIVARIATE INDEX ASSAYS (July 26, 2007), availa-
ble at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/. . ./ucm071455.pdf (“[In vi-
tro diagnostic multivariate assays] . . . do not fall within the scope of [laboratory
diagnostic test] over which FDA has generally exercised enforcement discretion”
as they “raise significant issues of safety and effectiveness.”).  FDA never issued
finalized guidance.  Turna Ray, FDA Shelves IVDMIA Final Guidelines in Order
to Focus on Overall LDT Regulation, PHARMACOGENOMICS REP. (June 23, 2010),
http://www.genomeweb.com/dxpgx/fda-shelves-ivdmia-final-guidelines-order-fo-
cus-overall-ldt-regulation (“It’s possible that we will issue [an in vitro diagnostic
multivariate assay] guidance in the future but with this public meeting [sched-
uled for July], we are addressing [laboratory developed tests] at once in a public
dialogue, instead of dealing with subset by subset.”).
158. See generally, SACGHS—2008, supra note 99.
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receive appropriate treatment.”159  To date, however, FDA has not re-
leased additional guidance.160
3. FDA Sends Notification Letters to Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic-Testing Companies
Marketing or distributing a medical device not cleared or approved
by FDA is a violation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.161  FDA,
however, generally operates under the assumption that companies in-
tend to comply with the law, such that notice of a violation is a stan-
dard, but not obligatory, part of FDA enforcement.162  Two types of
FDA notice are Warning Letters and Untitled Letters.  Warning Let-
ters highlight violations that may lead to enforcement action, such as
a recall or seizure of products, if not “promptly and adequately cor-
rected.”163  Untitled Letters are for less significant violations, such as
minimization of risk in product advertising.164  In 2010, FDA sent
twenty-three Untitled Letters to the DTC genetic-testing industry,165
which resulted in almost all companies dropping out of the DTC mar-
ket; 23andMe, however, began the premarket clearance regulatory
process.  However, in November 2013, FDA sent 23andMe a Warning
Letter requiring that it cease marketing its personal genome service
without FDA clearance or approval.166  23andMe stopped selling its
health-related testing package to consumers,167 and as of May 2014,
159. Oversight of Laboratory Developed Tests: Public Meeting: Request for Com-
ments, 75 Fed. Reg. 34,463, 34,463–64. (June 17, 2010).
160. See, e.g., Bill Malone, Straight Talk on Lab-Developed Tests From FDA, 39(10)
CLINICAL LABORATORY NEWS (Oct. 2013), http://www.aacc.org/publications/cln/
2013/october/Pages/AM-LDTs.aspx#.
161. 21 U.S.C § 331(a).
162. See Regulatory Procedures Manual, GRIMES & REESE, P.L.L.C., ch. 10, http://
www.mlmlaw.com/library/guides/fda/reg_proc/rchap10.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
163. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., WARNING AND UNTITLED LETTERS (Dec. 20, 2011), available
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/
GlossaryofAcronymsandAbbreviations/UCM212064.pdf [hereinafter FDA—
LETTERS].
164. See, e.g., Letter from Zarna Patel, Pharm.D., Regulatory Review Officer, Office of
Prescription Drug Promotion & Amy Toscano, Pharm.D., RAC, CPA, Team
Leader, Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, to Roxanne McGregor-Beck, Dir.,
Johnson & Johnson Int’l, Inc. (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActiv
itiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompa
nies/UCM357833.pdf.  FDA generally posts both types of letters online, making
both types available to the public. See FDA—LETTERS, supra note 163.
165. See, e.g., Letter to Plante, supra note 12.
166. See Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
167. Changes to Our Health-Related Product, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/
health/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2013) (“Customers who purchase or have purchased
23andMe’s Personal Genome Service (PGS) on or after November 22, 2013, the
date of the Warning Letter from the FDA, will receive ancestry information, as
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there was no major player on the DTC health-related genetic-testing
market.
a. Food and Drug Administration Untitled Letters
FDA first entered the DTC genetic-testing enforcement arena in
May 2010 when Pathway Genomics announced that it was going to
sell its “home-use saliva collection kit” at more than 6000 Walgreens
stores across the United States.168  Although Pathway had sold this
product online for the preceding two years, FDA stated it became con-
cerned that a partnership with Walgreens would make the DTC ge-
netic-testing kit more readily accessible to the public.169
As discussed above, FDA conducts its oversight of devices on the
basis of risk that a test will potentially give rise to an inaccurate test
result.170  An FDA representative stated that the DTC distribution of
genetic tests can increase the risk of a device because “a patient may
make a decision that adversely affects [his or her] health, such as
stopping or changing the dose of a medication or continuing an un-
healthy lifestyle, without the intervention of a learned intermedi-
ary.”171  He noted FDA’s belief that this increased risk raised the
importance of “ensuring that consumers are also provided accurate,
complete, and understandable information about the limitations of
test results they are obtaining.”172
FDA took immediate note of Pathway Genomics’ increase in public
access to genetic testing and sent an Untitled Letter on May 10, 2010,
informing the DTC genetic-testing company that its kit—“intended to
report customary and personal genetic health disposition results for
more than 70 health conditions, including pharmacogenetics, . . . pro-
pensity for complex disease, and carrier status” for the purpose of
health regime modification to “live a healthier, longer life”—
well as their raw genetic data without interpretation.  These new customers may
receive additional health-related results in the future, dependent upon FDA mar-
keting authorization.”) [hereinafter 23ANDME—Changes].
168. See, e.g., Pollack—Walgreens Delays, supra note 13; Shuren—Statement, supra
note 13.
169. See, e.g., Pollack—Walgreens Delays, supra note 13.  The following month,
23andMe had a lab error that resulted in ninety-six customers receiving and
viewing the wrong genetic data. See Shari Roan, Personal Genetic Test Results
Were Mixed Up, Company Admits, L.A. TIMES (June 8, 2010, 10:22 AM), http://
latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2010/06/genetic-testing-23andme-.html;
see also Michelle D. Irick, Comment, Age of an Information Revolution: The Di-
rect-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Industry and the Need for a Holistic Regulatory
Approach, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 279, 317 (2012) (stating that “a false advertise-
ment is misleading in a material respect whether it inaccurately represents the
product or fails to disclose material facts”).
170. Shuren—Statement, supra note 13.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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“appeared” to meet the definition of a device.173  FDA pointed out that
Pathway Genomics did not have clearance or approval for the kit and
requested that it respond within fifteen days.174
Walgreens, one of the largest pharmacy chains in the country and
a proposed distributor for Pathway’s test, decided to delay selling the
kit until the issue was resolved.175  Alberto Gutierrez, Director of the
Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation and Safety (and signa-
tory of subsequent Untitled Letters), pointed out that many DTC ge-
netic companies had different business models, so it was hard to
pinpoint exactly which companies needed FDA oversight; however,
“[o]nce you take a collection device and you are marketing through a
drugstore, it is very easy for me to say whether something would fall
under our policy.”176  Walgreens eventually dropped the plan entirely.
Pathway currently markets its genetic test online but only provides
results to physicians.177
The following month, FDA sent five additional Untitled Letters to
five different DTC companies.  As opposed to suggesting that these
genetic tests “appeared” to meet the definition of a device, FDA as-
serted that the tests were indeed devices based on the manufacturers’
claims regarding the test results.178  The tests at issue claimed to:
• “[D]escribe the genetic basis of specific disease traits or condi-
tions on which consumers may base medical decisions;
• [P]rovide personalized information on which medications are
more likely to work given a person’s genetic makeup; and
• [P]rovide genetic predispositions for important health condi-
tions and medication sensitivities.”179
The letters described FDA’s concerns that consumers might make
medical decisions in reliance on this potentially inaccurate genetic in-
terpretation and stated that devices must be “analytically and clini-
cally accurate so that individuals are not misled by incorrect test
results or unsupported clinical interpretations.”180  FDA also con-
firmed that it did not consider these devices to be laboratory developed
173. Letter to Plante, supra note 12.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Pollack—Walgreens Delays, supra note 13.
176. Id.
177. See General Questions, PATHWAY GENOMICS, https://www.pathway.com/medical-
professionals/physicians (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“A physician will need to reg-
ister with Pathway and order the report for you.”).
178. Shuren—Statement, supra note 13, at 7.
179. Id.
180. Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125.  FDA pointed out in these letters
that “premarket review allows for an independent and unbiased assessment of a
diagnostic test’s ability to generate tests results that can reliably be used to sup-
port good healthcare decisions.”  Id.
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tests, as they were not developed or used in a single laboratory.181
The FDA Untitled Letters did not require that companies pull their
tests from the market; rather, companies were requested to begin dis-
cussions with the FDA.182
The five companies that FDA targeted in this round included:
• Two companies (Knome and 23andMe) that used software pro-
grams that interpreted genetic data created by an external lab-
oratory in order to generate patient-specific medical
information;183
• A company (Navigenics) that claimed to provide personalized
medical information on which medications were more likely to
work best for a consumer given their “genetic makeup,” which
included providing consumers with genetic predispositions for
health conditions and medication sensitivities;184
• A company (deCODE Genetics) that provided genetic medical
information but obtained its components from other manufac-
turers;185 and
• A company (Illumina) that produced the genetic-analysis sys-
tem used by deCODE and 23andMe to do scans and interpreta-
tion to provide genetic information to their customers.186
181. See, e.g., id.
182. Dr. Gutierrez said in an interview with the New York Times that that it would be
“unfair” to remove the tests from the market when FDA had not yet clearly said
that they needed agency approval in the first place.  However, he stated FDA was
concerned because “[i]t is not unknown for women to take out their ovaries if they
are at high risk of ovarian cancer . . . .  [FDA] really [doesn’t] have any issues
with denying people information [,] we just want to make sure the information
they are given is correct.”  Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Faults Companies on Unap-
proved Genetic Tests, N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at B2 [hereinafter Pollack—
FDA Faults].
183. Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125; see Letter from Alberto Gutier-
rez, Ph.D., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for De-
vice & Radiological Health, to Anne Wojcicki, CEO and Co-Founder, 23andMe
(June 10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Re-
sourcesforYou/Industry/UCM215240.pdf [hereinafter Untitled Letter to
Wojcicki].
184. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Ph.D., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evalua-
tion & Safety, Ctr. for Device & Radiological Health, to Vance Vanier, M.D., Pres-
ident & CEO, Navigenics (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM215243.pdf.
185. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Ph.D., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evalua-
tion & Safety, Ctr. for Device & Radiological Health, to Earl M. Collier, CEO,
deCODE Genetics (June 20, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM215241.pdf [hereinafter Letter to
Collier].
186. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Ph.D., Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evalua-
tion & Safety, Ctr. for Device & Radiological Health, to Jay T. Flately, President
& CEO, Illumina, Inc. (June 10, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/medicaldevices/resourcesforyou/industry/ucm215242.pdf [hereinafter
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When queried by Newsweek as to why FDA waited three years
before engaging with the industry, Dr. Gutierrez pointed to the chang-
ing claims of the companies.  Three years ago, he argued, the claims
“were very, very vague”; now, companies were making claims about
metabolizing specific drugs and risk of specific chronic diseases.187
When questioned directly as to why FDA sent letters regarding
software programs that only interpreted corresponding medical infor-
mation from genetic data that consumers could have had generated
anywhere, Dr. Gutierrez responded that “[s]oftware is a medical de-
vice, and they’re making medical claims. They’re taking results and
making medical claims that come out of those results.”188
The following month, FDA sent out fourteen additional letters.
FDA again used language indicating that the tests at issue “appeared”
to meet the definition of a device, but FDA pointed out that it was
“unable to identify any [FDA] clearance or approval number” for any
of the products at issue189—the implication being that none of the
companies had engaged in premarket clearance or approval through
the Class II or III process, respectively.  Out of the fourteen companies
receiving Untitled Letters, half provided general genetic health pre-
disposition information—including information regarding cardiac
health, diabetes, obesity, immune efficiency, cancers, and “informa-
tion from which one can modify [his or her] health regime to live a
healthier, longer life.”190  The other half offered targeted genetic tests
Letter to Flately].  Illumina had labeled its product for “Research Use Only.”
However, FDA found that because Illumina knowingly provided the chip to the
companies for clinical diagnostic use, no matter how it was labeled or marketed,
the company was obligated to seek clearance or approval. See id.
187. Mary Carmichael, Why the FDA Is Cracking Down on Do-It-Yourself Genetic
Tests: An Exclusive Q&A, NEWSWEEK (June 11, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/newsweek/blogs/the-human-condition/2010/06/11/why-the-fda-is-cracking-
down-on-do-it-yourself-genetic-tests-an-exclusive-q-a.html [hereinafter Carmi-
chael—FDA Cracking Down].
188. Id.
189. Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office
of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, to Kenneth W. Friedenberg, Owner, Graceful Earth Inc. (July 19, 2010),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219585.pdf [hereinafter Letter to
Friedenberg].
190. Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office
of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, to Fei Lu, CEO, SeqWright DNA Technology Services, Inc. (July 19,
2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Productsand
MedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219586.pdf; Letter from James
Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnos-
tic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Lewis
H. Bender, CEO, Interleukin Genetics, Inc. (July 19, 2010), available at http://
www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitro
Diagnostics/UCM219587.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient
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marketed to provide medical information regarding Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, carrier status for genetic diseases of interest to persons of
Ashkenazi Jewish decent, individualized response to asthma medica-
tions, breast cancer, celiac disease, or fetal gene and chromosomal
abnormalities.191
Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation &
Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Marin Munzer, President &
CEO, CyGene Direct™ (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/
UCM219590.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Prod-
uct Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for
Devices & Radiological Health, to Bill White, President, The Genetic Testing
Laboratories, Inc. (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219593.
pdf.
191. See Letter to Friedenberg, supra note 189; Letter from James Woods, Deputy
Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Eval-
uation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Bennett Greenspan,
President & CEO, Family Tree DNA (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.fda.
gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnos-
tics/UCM219589.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety &
Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr.
for Devices & Radiological Health, to Chinh Bach, CEO, Consumer Genetics, LLC
(July 19, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/Prod-
uctsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219591.pdf; Letter from
James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro
Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to
Larry S. Corder, Ph.D., President & CEO, Matrix Genomics, Inc. (July 19, 2010),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedical
Procedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219592.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Dep-
uty Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device
Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Harry F. Hixson
Jr., Ph.D., Chairman & CEO, Sequenom®, Inc. (July 19, 2010), available at http:/
/www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitro
Diagnostics/UCM219595.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient
Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation &
Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Kenneth Fine, M.D., Medical
Dir. & Dir. of Operations, EnteroLab Reference Lab. (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedcalProcedures/
InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219596.pdf; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Pa-
tient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation &
Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, to Holt Vaughan, President,
HealthCheckUSA (July 19, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/UCM219600.
pdf.  Dr. Gutierrez, speaking with the Washington Post in 2010, stated that:
It’s come to the point where really there’s a need for some oversight . . . .
We know of reports of people who have found a test, found a doctor that
is willing to order the test since they are so afraid of the disease, and
even removed ovaries based on questionable results.
Rob Stein, Genetic Test Mix-Up Reignites Regulation Debate, WASH. POST, July
17, 2010, at A7.  During a later interview, however, Dr. Gutierrez stated that the
Washington Post took this quote out of context and that the cases that he was
referring to were of invalid laboratory tests, as opposed to DTC genetic tests.
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In May 2011, FDA sent out its final three Untitled Letters.  The
recipient companies claimed to provide athletes and parents of sports
competitors information regarding potential health conditions, along
with information about other diseases and conditions such as breast
cancer.192
b. Food and Drug Administration Warning Letter to
23andMe
In July 2012, 23andMe became the first DTC genetic company to
file de novo premarketing clearance for some of their health-related
genetic tests with FDA.193  At the time, 23andMe stated that it dis-
agreed that its services should even be considered a device and that
“we believe that people have the right to know as much about their
genes and their bodies as they choose.”194  23andMe nevertheless
planned to submit another 100 tests for review by the end of 2012.195
However, according to FDA, despite “more than 14 face-to-face and
teleconference meetings, hundreds of email exchanges, and dozens of
written communications”196 between FDA and 23andMe, FDA sent a
Warning Letter on November 22, 2013, cautioning the CEO of
23andMe that “[t]o date, 23andMe has failed to provide adequate in-
formation to support a determination that the [personal genome ser-
Mary Carmichael, DNA Dilemma: The Full Interview with the FDA on DTC Ge-
netic Tests, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2010 [hereinafter Carmichael—DNA Dilemma].
192. Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office
of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, to Romain Bonjean, CEO, Lumigenix Inc. (May 11, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiag-
nostics/ucm255347.htm; Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety &
Product Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr.
for Devices & Radiological Health, to Bill Miller, CEO, American International
Biotechnology Services (May 11, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/Medical
Devices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiagnostics/ucm255348.htm;
Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office
of In Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, to Andre Gous, CEO, Precision Quality DNA (May 11, 2011), available at
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/InVitroDiag-
nostics/ucm255349.htm.
193. See 23andMe—TWITTER, supra note 146; & 23andMe Takes First Step Toward
FDA Clearance, supra note 15. The 510(k) de novo review process is for products
that do not rise to the level of Class III regulation. See FDA—DE NOVO CLASSIFI-
CATION, supra note 145, at 5 (“If we grant the de novo petition, the device is re-
classified from class III into class I or class II.”); Warning Letter to Wojcicki,
supra note 8.
194. Pollack—FDA Faults, supra note 182.  One director there, however, described
FDA’s actions as “appallingly paternalistic.” Id.
195. Matthew Perrone, 23andMe Seeks FDA Approval for Personal DNA Test, BLOOM-
BERG BUSINESSWEEK NEWS, July 30, 2012 [hereinafter Perrone—23andMe].
196. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
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vice] is substantially equivalent to a legally marketed predicate for
any of the uses for which you are marketing it . . . .”197
The letter stated that FDA was primarily concerned about the
“public health consequences of inaccurate results from the [personal
genome service] device” given that “the main purpose of compliance
with FDA’s regulatory requirements is to ensure that the tests
work.”198  FDA cited to two 23andMe health-related tests as being
particularly worrisome, including assessments for BRCA-related ge-
netic risks (associated with breast and ovarian cancer) and drug re-
sponses (e.g., blood anticoagulant sensitivity), “because of the
potential health consequences that could result from false positive or
false negative assessments for high-risk indications such as these,” in-
cluding that consumers could potentially undergo unwarranted pro-
phylactic surgeries or might inaccurately self-manage their drug
dosages.199
Despite the lack of pre-marketing clearance or approval, 23andMe
had recently hired a new president to grow their product marketing,
launch a television and Internet advertising campaign, and reach its
goal of one million members by the end of 2013.200  But much like
when Pathway Genomics announced its potential rapid expansion of
clientele via Walgreens in 2010201—a move that instigated the initial
twenty-three Untitled Letters to the industry (including
23andMe)202—this potentially increased consumer base factored into
FDA’s decision to act.203  In its Warning Letter, FDA cautioned
23andMe it was marketing its personal genome service without clear-
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.  On November 27, 2013, a class action lawsuit was also filed claiming that
23andMe “falsely and misleadingly advertises their Saliva Collection Kit/Per-
sonal Genome Service . . . as providing ‘health reports on 240+ conditions or
traits,’ ‘drug response,’ [and] ‘carrier status,’ among other things, when there is
no analytical or clinical validation for the [personal genome service] for its adver-
tised uses.”  Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Casey v. 23andMe, No. 13CV2847 H
JMA (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2013).
200. See Kara Swisher, 23andMe Names Former Gilt Exec Andy Page as President,
ALL THINGS DIGITAL (June 11, 2013), http://allthingsd.com/20130611/23andme-
names-former-gilt-exec-andy-page-as-president/; Christina Farr, Why the FDA is
Targeting Google-Backed 23andMe: Unnecessary MRIs, Mastectomies, VEN-
TUREBEAT (Nov. 26, 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/11/26/warning-letter-to-
23andme-could-be-a-landmark-case-for-health-care/ (“In this particular case, the
FDA may have taken issue with 23andMe’s aggressive marketing tactics.”).
201. See, e.g., Pollack—Walgreens Delays, supra note 13; Shuren—Statement, supra
note 13.
202. See Untitled Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 183.
203. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8. (“[W]e have become aware that you
have initiated new marketing campaigns, including television commercials that,
together with an increasing list of indications, show that you plan to expand the
PGS’s uses and consumer base without obtaining marketing authorization from
FDA.”).
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ance or approval and the device was therefore both “adulterated” and
“misbranded.”204  Thus, “months after [23andMe] submitted [its]
510(k)s and more than 5 years after [it] began marketing,” FDA re-
quested 23andMe to “immediately discontinue marketing the [per-
sonal genome service] until such time as it receives FDA marketing
authorization for the device”205 or face seizure, injunction, or civil
money penalties.206  FDA also stated that 23andMe’s previous
premarket clearance submissions were considered withdrawn.207
23andMe immediately penned a press release stating that “[w]e
recognize that we have not met the FDA’s expectations regarding
timeline and communication regarding our submission. Our relation-
ship with the FDA is extremely important to us and we are committed
to fully engaging with them to address their concerns.”208  On Decem-
ber 5, 2013, 23andMe disassembled its health-related offerings on its
Web site and stopped providing new customers with health-related ge-
netic information (retroactive to the November 22 date of the Warning
Letter), reaffirming its continued commitment to clearing its health-
related genetic tests through appropriate FDA processes.209  23andMe
continues to offer ancestry testing and still returns consumers’ raw
genetic data without interpretation.210
204. Id.  The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act prohibits introduction or delivery for intro-
duction into interstate commerce any device that is adulterated or misbranded.
21 U.S.C § 331(a).  Despite some apparent confusion regarding what FDA meant
by requesting that 23andMe cease “marketing” their product (see Michael del
Castillo, Calm Down About 23andMe, the Media Is Getting It Wrong, UPSTART
BUS. J. (Dec. 3, 2013), http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news/technology/2013/12/03/
23andme-website-after-fda-warning.html?page=all (last visited Dec. 31, 2013)
(“Not being able to market is certainly bad for business, but as of now there’s no
reason to believe the company has stopped selling it’s [sic] product.”)). “Market-
ing” in this regulatory context is broader than advertising.
205. See Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 23andMe Statement Regarding FDA Warning Letter, 23ANDME, http://media
center.23andme.com/press-releases/fda-letter-2013 (last visited Dec. 31, 2013).
209. See, e.g., 23andMe, Inc. Provides Update, supra note 9 (“We remain firmly com-
mitted to fulfilling our long-term mission to help people everywhere have access
to their own genetic data and have the ability to use that information to improve
their lives . . . . Our goal is to work cooperatively with the FDA to provide that
opportunity in a way that clearly demonstrates the benefit to people and the va-
lidity of the science that underlies the test.”).
210. 23ANDME—Changes, supra note 167. (“Customers who purchase or have pur-
chased 23andMe’s Personal Genome Service (PGS) on or after November 22,
2013, the date of the Warning Letter from the FDA, will receive ancestry infor-
mation, as well as their raw genetic data without interpretation.”).
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c. What the Food and Drug Administration Letters Mean for
the Industry
Twenty-four letters into FDA’s engagement with DTC genetic test-
ing, several things of import to the industry have become clear.  First,
in contrast to its tentative first letter to Pathway Genomics stating
that their product appeared to meet the definition of a medical de-
vice,211 FDA has stated confidently that products such as 23andMe’s
DTC genetic test are devices because their saliva collection kit is an
“article”212 that is “intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or
other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease . . . .”213  For example, the 23andMe personal genome service
was marketed as “providing ‘health reports on 254 diseases and condi-
tions,’ including categories such as ‘carrier status,’ ‘health risks,’ and
‘drug response,’ and specifically as a ‘first step in prevention’ that en-
ables users to ‘take steps toward mitigating serious diseases’ such as
diabetes, coronary heart disease, and breast cancer.”214  In fact, FDA
concluded that most of the intended uses for when 23andMe was mar-
keting were medical device uses.215
Second, FDA is not going to consider DTC genetic tests marketed
to consumers for health-related indications to fall under either the
laboratory developed tests/home brew or the research/investigational
use only exemptions.  Although DTC genetic tests are in vitro diagnos-
tic devices,216 the original Untitled Letters clearly stated that FDA
did not consider the genetic tests to fall under the laboratory devel-
oped tests/home brew exemption to regulation.217  Scholars have ar-
gued that FDA concluded that the genetic tests did not qualify
because the genetic data (the As, Ts, Cs, and Gs that make up human
DNA) were generated at an outside laboratory, while the correspond-
ing medical information resulting from the interpretation of the ge-
netic material (e.g., that a particular genetic variant was associated
with increased consumer risk for diabetes) was done in-house—
211. Letter to Plante, supra note 12.
212. Hank Greely, The FDA Drops an Anvil on 23andMe—Now What?, CENTER FOR L.
& BIOSCIENCES BLOG (Nov. 25, 2013), http://blogs.law.stanford.edu/lawandbios-
ciences/2013/11/25/the-fda-drops-an-anvil-on-23andme-%E2%80%93-now-what/
(“A plastic tube for collecting spit doesn’t look much like an MRI machine or an
implantable left ventricular assist device, but it is an “article” that, from its mar-
keting information, 23andMe ‘intend[s] for [medical] use.’”).
213. 21 U.S.C § 321(h) (2006); Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
214. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
215. Id.
216. 21 C.F.R. § 809.3 (2009).
217. See, e.g., Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125 (“You should be aware
that FDA does not consider your device to be a laboratory developed test because
the KnomeCOMPLETE™ is not developed by and used in a single laboratory.”).
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thereby constituting a two-step process.218  Also, these genetic tests
were far from the “relatively simple, well-understood” tests used by
physicians and pathologists in their clinical laboratory that inspired
the original exemption.219  Finding DTC genetic tests to be laboratory
developed tests seemingly undermined the policy goals behind the
original exemption.220
Likewise, labeling devices for research or investigational use only,
but marketing them to consumers for health-related purposes, is not
going to exempt device manufacturers from FDA clearance or ap-
proval.  Indeed, a year after the Untitled Letters, FDA released gui-
dance confirming that any research or investigational use only
product must be labeled “For Research Use Only. Not for use in diag-
nostic procedures” and has to be noninvasive and low-risk.221  In addi-
tion, any research or investigational use only device must “not be used
as a diagnostic procedure without confirmation of the diagnosis by an-
other, medically established diagnostic product or procedure.”222  FDA
218. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 501–02 (“This distinction seems to emphasize the
two-step process used by these services: after the third-party laboratory ge-
notypes a consumer’s sample, the information is then transmitted to the DTC
company for interpretation.”).
219. FDA to Host Public Meeting on Oversight of Laboratory-Developed Tests, FDA
(June 16, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce-
ments/2010/ucm215766.htm.
220. See Bair, supra note 51, at 432 (“To exempt a subset of DTC genetic tests from
more comprehensive regulation under the [laboratory developed test] enforce-
ment exception because these tests happen to be developed and performed in the
same lab—a feature that has little relation to the broader concerns surrounding
DTC genetic testing—while other DTC genetic tests are subject to full regulatory
review would constitute both an uneven application of the law and unwise
policy.”).
221. FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY, supra note 127, at 6.
222. Id.  FDA expressed concern that the “use of such tests for clinical diagnostic pur-
poses may mislead healthcare providers and cause serious adverse health conse-
quences to patients, who are not aware that they are being diagnosed with
research or investigational products.” Id. at 5.  In August 2013, the Medical Test-
ing Availability Act was introduced in the House of Representatives as a response
to this new draft guidance.  This Act would amend the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act to state that a product with research use only labeling:
may not be deemed to be misbranded under this Act on the basis that the
manufacturer or distributer of the product: (A) sells the product to an
end user who uses the product in a manner inconsistent with such state-
ment; or (B) engages in business communications regarding the product
with an end user of the product.
Medical Testing Availability Act of 2013, H.R. 3005, 113th Cong. (2013).  It was
supported strongly by the President and CEO of the Biotechnology Industry Or-
ganization (BIO), who issued a press release stating that “Guidance recently re-
leased by FDA would make manufacturers responsible for downstream use of a
product outside of a manufacturer’s control.  FDA’s approach in the [Draft Gui-
dance] is impractical for manufacturers to implement, and threatens patient ac-
cess to important clinical and research tools that have been used in pathology
laboratories for decades . . . to expand the definition of intended use to include
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warned that any in vitro diagnostic device not intended for research or
investigational use only, but labeled as such, would be deemed “mis-
branded” under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, potentially trigger-
ing heavy penalties.223  For example, in its Terms of Service, 23andMe
stated that its services “are for research, informational, and educa-
tional use only.  We do not provide medical advice.”224  But FDA
looked to 23andMe’s marketing, which claimed to provide health re-
ports for “a first step in prevention” enabling users to “take steps to-
ward mitigating serious diseases” to support its conclusion that
23andMe’s genetic test was, in fact, being marketed as a medical
device.225
Also in this research use only guidance, and in turning away from
typical drug-marketing policy, FDA clarified that assessing the intent
of research or investigational use only in vitro diagnostic device manu-
facturers would include looking to “the manufacturer’s knowledge that
its product is offered and used for a purpose for which it is neither
labeled nor advertised,” as opposed to only requiring the manufac-
turer to use appropriate labeling or advertising.226  This reinforces the
position FDA took in 2010, treating Illumina’s Infinium
HumanHap550 array (a system of genetic analysis used by deCODE
and 23andMe to provide genetic information to their customers) as an
independent medical device.227  In fact, just three days before
23andMe was sent its Warning Letter, FDA announced the clearance
of four Illumina next generation sequencing diagnostic devices—in-
cluding two assays analyzing the CFTR gene (detecting mutations and
variants associated with cystic fibrosis) and granting de novo petitions
for Illumina’s sequencer and universal kit that allows laboratories to
develop their own diagnostic tests.228
downstream use of the product outside of a manufacturer’s control ignores legal
precedent, and establishes a significant shift in the regulation of product promo-
tion under the Agency’s jurisdiction.” BIO Praises House for Introducing the
Medical Testing Availability Act of 2013, BIO (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.bio.org/
media/press-release/bio-praises-house-introducing-medical-testing-availability-
act-2013.
223. FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY, supra note 127, at 6.
224. Terms of Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/tos/ (last visited
Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter 23ANDME—Terms of Service].
225. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
226. FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY, supra note 127, at 6.
227. See Letter to Flately, supra note 186.
228. FDA Allows Marketing of Four “Next Generation” Gene Sequencing Devices, FDA
(Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannouncements/
ucm375742.htm [hereinafter FDA—FDA Allows Marketing].  It is worth noting,
however, that FDA in its press release did not mention DTC use of the devices
and rather focused on giving “physicians the ability to take a broader look at
their patients’ genetic makeup and [helping] in diagnosing disease or identifying
the cause of symptoms.” Id.; Jennifer K. Wagner, What Does the FDA Approval of
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The third major conclusion from the FDA letters is a related one:
that FDA can consider components used together to generate patient-
specific medical information to be independent devices.229  This is true
even when components are used to analyze genetic data produced by
another company.  Thus Illumina, which was marketing products to
produce genetic data, received an Untitled Letter just as did deCODE,
which was producing genetic information for consumers.230
Last, the letters and Illumina clearance offer insight regarding the
possible regulatory classification of DTC genetic tests.  As discussed
above, Illumina recently received FDA “premarket clearance” for two
of their cystic-fibrosis-related products and was granted de novo peti-
tions for its sequencer and universal kit reagents.231  Pre-marketing
clearance is for Class II devices, which require stricter labeling re-
quirements, performance standards, and/or postmarket surveillance
than Class I, but which are perceived to be less risky than Class III
devices.232  The fact that two of Illumina’s devices were granted de
novo petitions also means that Illumina successfully established that
its devices, despite being novel and unique with no substantially
equivalent predicate, were still low- to moderate-risk and should not
have to go through the regulatory burdens of the Class III premarket
approval process.
As FDA pointed out in its Warning Letter to 23andMe, however,
most of 23andMe’s advertised uses for its personal genome service
were not currently classified, and therefore required “premarket ap-
proval or de novo classification . . . .”233  This was the process that
23andMe had begun in 2012.234  FDA stated that, since then, it had
spent “significant time” evaluating 23andMe’s intended uses to deter-
mine whether its personal genome service should be classified as a
Class II or Class III device and even “proposed modifications to the
device’s labeling that could mitigate risks and render certain intended
uses appropriate for de novo classification.”235  However, FDA stated
that 23andMe failed to provide information to support a determina-
the MiSeqDx Platform Mean for DTC?, GENOMICS L. REP. (Dec. 31, 2013), http://
www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/author/wagjen/.
229. See Letter to Flately, supra note 186.
230. See id.; Letter to Collier, supra note 185.
231. See Illumina’s MiSeqDxTM Receives FDA Premarket Clearance with Two Cystic
Fibrosis Assays and Universal Kit for Open Use: Premarket Clearance is an In-
dustry First for Next-Generation Sequencing System, ILLUMINA (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://investor.illumina.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=121127&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=
1878430&highlight=; FDA—FDA Allows Marketing, supra note 228.
232. See FDA—Controls, supra note 137; 21 C.F.R § 807 (2013).
233. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8 (italics added).
234. 23andMe Takes First Step Toward FDA Clearance, supra note 15.
235. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8 (emphasis added).  This implies that
FDA was considering treating the personal genome service as made up of individ-
ual devices that could be regulated accordingly.
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tion that its product was substantially equivalent to a legally mar-
keted predicate (i.e., a traditional 510(k) application) or information to
support a de novo petition (i.e., that there was no predicate device, but
it was still low to moderate risk).236  Thus, FDA informed 23andMe
that it was going to consider the entire personal genome service to be a
Class III device.237
B. Federal Trade Commission: Regulation of Advertising
and Engagement with the Direct-to-Consumer
Genetic-Testing Industry
Although FDA retains authority over the labeling of medical de-
vices, FTC has the power to regulate DTC advertising to ensure that it
is not false or misleading.238  Generally, FTC works to reduce “fraud,
deception, and unfair business practices in the marketplace.”239
While FDA regulates medical device labeling, such as packaging dis-
play panels and warnings, FTC retains responsibility for the regula-
tion of nonprescription device advertising.240  FTC will consider an
advertisement false if it fails to reveal material facts relevant to its
use and consequences.241  If a claim relates to public health, it will
presumptively be considered material.  For example, when POM Won-
derful advertising claimed that its product “prevents or reduces the
risk of” or “treats” heart disease, prostate cancer, or erectile dysfunc-
tion, FTC intervened and barred POM marketers from making claims
that their product was “effective in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation,
treatment, or prevention of any disease.”242
DTC genetic tests, by definition, are available to the public without
a prescription—thus their advertising falls under the FTC’s jurisdic-
tion.  In 2006, in conjunction with FDA and CDC, FTC released a cau-
tionary consumer pamphlet regarding “At Home Genetic Tests.”243  In
this release, FTC educated consumers about the complicated basis for
genetic medical claims, pointing out that diseases typically are caused
by interactions between genes and environmental factors, and that
consumers should be cautious in assuming that the tests are clinically
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Who We Are, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter
FTC—Who We Are]; 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2006).
239. Id.
240. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Fed. Trade Commission and the
Food and Drug Admin., FDA (Apr. 27, 1971), available at http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/Do-
mesticMOUs/ucm115791.htm.
241. 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) (2006).
242. In the matter of Pom Wonderful LLC, F.T.C. Docket No. 9344, 2012 WL 2340406
(F.T.C.) (May 17, 2012); Irick, supra note 169, at 317.
243. FTC—Consumer Alert, supra note 98.
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valid.244  In addition, FTC recommended that consumers discuss any
DTC results with a healthcare professional, as genetic test results are
“complex and serious,” and medical decisions should not be based on
“incomplete, inaccurate, or misunderstood information.”245  Finally,
FTC warned consumers that while FDA generally confirms the safety
and effectiveness of home-use medical tests, FDA had not reviewed
any DTC genetic test or evaluated the accuracy of any claims.246
In January 2014, FTC also filed a complaint against GeneLink,
Inc. and Foru International Corporation, which both sold nutritional
supplements and skincare products allegedly tailored to consumers’
DNA.247  FTC alleged that these companies represented that their
custom-blended nutritional supplements “1) effectively compensate for
genetic disadvantages identified by [their] DNA assessments, thereby
reducing an individual’s risk of impaired health or illness, and 2) treat
or mitigate diabetes, heart disease, arthritis, and insomnia”248 (both
of which are nutrigenetic claims similar to the ones that GAO investi-
gated in 2006).249  For example, in a monthly news letter, Foru (for-
merly GeneWize) highlighted a “top leader” who claimed that six
months after he began taking the product “[his] blood sugar [had] sta-
bilized . . . and [his] diabetic problem [was] over, while a recent medi-
cal report [had] revealed the reduction of [his] heart to normal
size.”250 Supplements and skin repair serum through these companies
cost more than $100 per month.251 The FTC found GeneLink, Inc. and
Foru International Corporation’s claims to be false and misleading
and published consent agreements for final approval that prohibited
the companies from making any such health benefit, performance, or
health efficacy claims in the future unless they are substantiated by
reliable scientific evidence.252
FTC’s power to regulate DTC marketing compliments FDA’s over-
sight over DTC labeling and clinical validity.  Coming on the heels of
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See id.
247. Complaint at 1–2, In re GeneLink, Inc. & Foru Int’l Corp., No. 112-3095 (F.T.C.
Jan. 7, 2014).
248. GeneLink, Inc.; Foru™ International Corporation; Analysis of Proposed Consent
Orders to Aid Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 2,662, 2,663 (Jan. 15, 2014).
249. GAO—2006, supra note 90.
250. Complaint at 8, In re GeneLink, Inc. & Foru Int’l Corp., No. 112-3095 (F.T.C. Jan.
7, 2014).
251. Companies Pitching Genetically Customized Nutritional Supplements Will Drop
Misleading Disease Claims; GeneLink, Inc. and Former Subsidiary Also Agree to
Improved Safeguards of Consumers’ Sensitive Medical Information, FTC (Jan. 7,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/companies-pitch-
ing-genetically-customized-nutritional-supplements.
252. GeneLink, Inc.; Foru™ International Corporation; Analysis of Proposed Consent
Orders to Aid Public Comment, 79 Fed. Reg. 2,662, 2,664 (Jan. 15, 2014).
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FDA’s Warning Letter to 23andMe, FTC’s foray into prosecuting com-
panies for violating its regulations creates a potentially powerful gov-
ernmental partnership.
C. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
In addition to FDA and FTC, CMS has jurisdiction to protect con-
sumers who obtain DTC genetic testing through enforcement of CLIA,
a law that requires certification of laboratories that analyze human
specimens to “report patient specific results”253 regarding “informa-
tion for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of any disease.”254
CLIA focuses on the quality control and assurance of laboratory test-
ing and assurance of analytic validity (how well a test recognizes a
genetic variant).  CLIA does not, however, address clinical validity
(the association of a variant with a disease or medical condition) or
clinical utility (whether the information regarding a disease or medi-
cal condition can be of clinical use to a consumer)255 or review labora-
tory marketing or communications.256
CLIA divides tests into three levels: tests that are so straightfor-
ward they receive a waiver, tests of moderate complexity, and tests of
high complexity.257  Tests of moderate and high complexity must es-
tablish “performance specifications” for tests that ensure precision,
analytical sensitivity and specificity, and other characteristics “re-
quired for test performance.”258  Through CLIA, CMS requires labora-
tories to “ensure that their test results are accurate, reliable, timely,
and confidential and do not present the risk of harm to patients.”259
253. 42 C.F.R. § 493.3(b)(2) (2003).
254. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2003).  CLIA was first passed in 1967 in response to the varia-
bility of clinical testing upon which healthcare professionals based medical treat-
ment decisions.  They were updated in 1988 after an expose´ in the Wall Street
Journal covering inadequate oversight of test results such as Papanicolaou tests
(i.e., “pap smears”). See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Lax Laboratories: The Pap Test
Misses Much Cervical Cancer Through Labs’ Errors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1987.
For further discussion, see Hutt, supra note 125, at 6–7.
255. U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., How Can Consumers Be Sure a Genetic Test Is Valid
and Useful?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/test-
ing/validtest (last visited Jan. 6, 2013); see also Matthew Piehl, Regulating Hype
and Hope: A Business Ethics Model Approach to Potential Oversight of Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Tests, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & LAW 59, 75, 76 (2011) (“CLIA,
then, only governs the conduct of the laboratory, not the accuracy of the results
obtained by the test.  CLIA merely ensures that the laboratory conducts the ge-
netic test in a scientifically valid and reliable manner.”).
256. See Piehl, supra note 255, at 75.
257. 42 C.F.R. § 493.5 (2003).
258. 42 C.F.R. § 493.1253 (2003).
259. Id. § 493.1253(b)(2)(vii).  While CMS, with the help of CDC, provides compliance
guidance to laboratories, they do not provide specific protocols. See, e.g.,
SACGHS—2008, supra note 99, at 3.
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Generally, moderate or high complexity tests must adhere to a profi-
ciency-testing program—a process by which a laboratory’s genetic
tests are compared to, and measured against, an established external
standard—“considered to be the most rigorous form of performance
assessment currently available.”260  CLIA lays out detailed profi-
ciency testing requirements for these specialties and subspecialties in
its regulations.261
Genetic testing generally falls under CLIA’s purview as it analyzes
human specimens to report patient specific results regarding diagno-
sis of disease.  23andMe, for example, performs its genotyping in
LabCorp’s CLIA-certified laboratory.  23andMe still labeled its health
reports, however, as “intended for research and educational purposes
only, and . . . not for diagnostic use.”262  Its “health reports” Web site,
before being pulled down, included the warning that “tests have not
been cleared or approved by the FDA but have been analytically vali-
dated according to CLIA standards.”263
While CLIA requires a testing request from an “authorized person”
(who is also the only person allowed to receive the test results),264 this
authorized person needs only be “authorized under State law to order
tests or receive test results.”  It need not be a healthcare profes-
sional265 and could be a DTC company or an individual.  Therefore,
CLIA certified laboratories may, state law permitting, run testing and
return results directly to consumers.266
Scholars have voiced several concerns about CLIA’s capacity to en-
sure valid DTC genetic testing.  First, much like the focus of FDA’s
premarket clearance 510(k) process, CLIA’s main goal is to ensure an-
alytic validity.  However, a significant concern about genetic testing is
not whether the test itself is performed correctly, but whether the test
260. SACGHS—2008, at 4.
261. 42 C.F.R. § 493.801(b) (1992).
262. 23ANDME—Health Reports, supra note 71.
263. Id. (“The information on this page is intended for research and educational pur-
poses only, and is not for diagnostic use.”).
264. 42 C.F.R. §§ 493.1241, 493.1291 (2003).
265. 42 C.F.R. § 493.2 (2003); see also Palmer, supra note 42, at 503 (stating that the
authorized person need not be a physician).
266. Palmer, supra note 42, at 504.  CDC also plays a role regarding genetic testing.
In 2004, it created the Evaluation of Genomic Applications in Practice and Pre-
vention to act as an independent advisory working group to “establish and assess
a ‘systematic, evidence-based process for evaluating genetic tests and other appli-
cations of genomic technology that are in transition from research to clinical and
public health practice’” with a goal of providing “objective, timely, and credible
information that is clearly linked to available scientific evidence” to “distinguish
genetic tests that are safe and useful.”  Jessica D. Gabel, Redeeming the Genetic
Groupon: Efficacy, Ethics, and Exploitation in Marketing DNA to the Masses, 81
MISS. L.J. 363, 422 (2012).  Following the Evaluation of Genomic Applications in
Practice and Prevention recommendations, however, is not mandatory for CLIA-
certified laboratories. Id.
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is clinically valid and the results are clinically useful.267  For exam-
ple, the recognition of a genetic variant on the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene
is not the same as establishing its relationship to a heightened risk of
breast cancer.  Analytic validity is therefore a necessary, but not suffi-
cient, step toward ensuring clinical validity—a test that satisfies the
highest analytic standards might nevertheless produce genetic infor-
mation that is inaccurate if the association between the genetic vari-
ant and clinical manifestation of disease is not strong.268  CLIA,
however, does nothing to ensure the clinical validity or utility of par-
ticular concern for genetic medical information.269
Another limitation of CLIA is that while genetic testing is gener-
ally considered to be highly complex, there is no proficiency genetic-
testing subspecialty recognized.270  Thus, while a laboratory that per-
forms genetic testing is required to “establish and maintain the accu-
racy of its testing procedures,”271 any detailed proficiency
requirements are absent.272  Agencies and specialty committees have
been calling for the establishment of a genetic-testing specialty since
1997, but in 2006 CMS publically stated it was no longer pursuing
that option.273
267. Palmer, supra note 42, at 511.
268. Bair, supra note 51, at 428 (CLIA “does not address situations, often encountered
in DTC genetic health tests, where a test may be performed correctly, but the
results themselves are misleading.  This could occur, for example, if a test is
based on weak association data or is valid only for a specific ethnic group”).
269. Palmer, supra note 42, at 511.
270. See Am. Soc’y of Human Genetics Bd. of Dirs., ASHG Statement on Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Testing in the United States, 81 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 635,
636 (2007).
271. 42 C.F.R. § 493.801(a)(2)(ii) (1992).
272. A Laboratory might therefore meet the accuracy requirements in a number of
ways, including “conducting its own statistical tests of patient results or compar-
ing its test results with another lab.”  Bair, supra note 51, at 427.
273. In 1997, an NIH and Department of Energy joint Task Force on Genetic Testing
began the call, later taken up by both CDC and the Advisory Committee. See
Neil A. Holtzman, Promoting Safe and Effective Genetic Tests in the United
States: Work of the Task Force on Genetic Testing, 45 Clinical Chemistry 732, 736
(1999); SACGHS—2008, supra note 99, at 13.  Of particular relevance to the DTC
testing industry is a 2011 CMS-proposed rulemaking with the goal of amending
CLIA to specify that laboratories must provide access to identifiable completed
test reports at a patient’s (or consumer’s) request.  While the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act’s [HIPAA] Privacy Rule currently exempts
CLIA laboratories from the requirement that test reports must be returned to
individuals upon request, this proposed rule would revoke that exemption—giv-
ing individuals “the right to receive their test reports directly from laboratories.”
CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 76
Fed. Reg. 56,712, 56,712 (Sept. 14, 2011).
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D. Patent and Trademark Office and the Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.
A recent decision by the Supreme Court, Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,274 limited the ability of PTO to grant
patents on human genetic material.  Patents held on genetic material
threatened the business models of DTC companies, many of which
claimed to provide interpretation of variants that were subject to pat-
ent.  The Supreme Court’s decision removed a potential barrier to
DTC large-scale genetic testing and genomic sequencing.
Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as
“any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof . . . .”275  Genetic
patents generally fall into two main categories: (1) composition of mat-
ter claims and (2) process, or “method,” claims.276  Composition of
matter patents for genetic material generally claim physically isolated
DNA molecules.277  Molecules that were not isolated using human in-
tervention, however, already exist in nature and therefore fall outside
the scope of patent-eligible material.  Although genetic patents cover
the physically isolated DNA molecule, they do not permit exclusive
use of the meaning of the information contained therein.278
A method patent, by contrast, covers a specific way of doing some-
thing.279  For example, a method patent could cover the particular
steps required to analyze whether a particular genetic variant gives
rise to physical symptoms of disease.  Method patents are considered
less protective than composition of matter patents because they are
infringed only if another party replicates every step of the method de-
scribed—even one alteration is enough to avoid infringement.280
Composition claims are considered more protective as they are harder
for others to innovate around.281  Myriad Genetics held both method
and composition of matter claims related to the BRCA genes (variants
of which are associated with breast and cervical cancer); although
others were able to test particular cancer drugs in ways that avoided
Myriad’s method claims, Myriad claimed that any tests or procedures
274. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017 (2013).
275. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (emphasis added).
276. See W. Nicholson Price II, Does Whole Genome Sequencing Circumvent Gene Pat-
ents?, BIO IT WORLD (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.bio-itworld.com/2012/12/10/does-
whole-genome-sequencing-circumvent-gene-patents.html [hereinafter Price—
Gene Patents].
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. John Conley, Some Thoughts on Myriad After the Supreme Court Argument, GE-
NOMICS L. REP. (May 1, 2013), http://www.genomicslawreport.com/wp-content/
plugins/as-pdf/generate.php?post=12729.
280. See id.
281. See id.
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that involved isolating BRCA genes infringed on its composition of
matter patent.282
Although Myriad Genetics holds one of the most widely recognized
genetic patents, it is by no means alone in patenting genetic material.
One estimate claimed that twenty to thirty percent of the human gen-
ome was patented before Myriad was decided.283  23andMe itself
holds a patent on “Polymorphisms associated with Parkinson’s dis-
ease,”284 which claims a method of screening individuals for suscepti-
bility to Parkinson’s disease.285
Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern about the advis-
ability of granting patents on genetic material from a public policy
perspective.  In its report entitled Gene Patents and Licensing Prac-
tices and Their Impact on Patient Access to Genetic Tests, the Advisory
Committee (discussed in subsection II.C.2 of this Article) found that
“patents on genetic discoveries do not appear to be necessary for either
basic genetic research or the development of available genetic tests”
and that “patents have been used to narrow or clear the market of
existing tests, thereby limiting, rather than promoting availability of
testing.”286  In addition, “when there is a patent-enforcing sole pro-
vider, patients cannot obtain independent second-opinion testing, and
sample sharing as a means of ensuring the quality of testing is not
possible.”287  Moreover, because the federal government is a major
funder of basic genetic research, it found that “the prospect of patent
protection of a genetic research discovery does not play a significant
role in motivating scientists to conduct genetic research.”288
The Advisory Committee also pointed out ways that patents can
restrict consumer access to genetic tests.  It noted that more than fifty
private and public entities offer testing for cystic fibrosis under a non-
exclusive license,289 and more than fifty academic and commercial
282. See id.
283. See Tia Ghose, 6 Ways Gene Patent Case Could Impact Biotechnology, LIVE SCI.
(Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.livescience.com/28731-gene-patent-supreme-court-
implications.html.
284. See Dan Vorhaus, Patenting and Personal Genomics: 23andMe Receives Its First
Patent, and Plenty of Questions, GENOMICS L. REP. (June 1, 2012), http://www.
genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2012/06/01/patenting-and-personal-genomics-
23andme-receives-its-first-patent-and-plenty-of-questions/.
285. It is based on variants in eight particular regions of the genome and generates a
prognosis based on analyzing those genetic variants in consideration with an in-
dividual’s family history, diet, exercise, and medical history. See id.
286. Letter from Steven Teutsch, M.D., Current Chair, SACGHS, to The Hon. Kath-
leen Sebelius, Sec’y, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. (Mar. 31, 2010), in
SACGHS—GENE PATENTS, supra note 110 [hereinafter Letter from Teutsch to
Sebelius—March, 2010].
287. Id.
288. SACGHS—GENE PATENTS, supra note 110, at 1.
289. Id. at 2.
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laboratories offer genetic testing for Huntington’s disease under a
non-exclusive license.290  When companies successfully enforce their
exclusive rights over a genetic variant, as had been the case with ge-
netic tests for breast cancer, there is often only one company providing
the genetic test to the public.291  The Advisory Committee therefore
concluded that “the presence of multiple laboratories offering compet-
ing genetic testing for the same condition can also lead to improve-
ments in the overall quality of testing through innovation in
developing novel and more thorough techniques of testing.”292
Beyond the particular policy considerations about patent claims
are concerns about whether and to what extent patents on genetic ma-
terial could discourage companies from offering large-scale testing
and genomic sequencing and correspondingly hamper advances ex-
pected to arise from continued analysis of the relationship between
genetic data and medical information.293  Because genomic sequenc-
ing involves determining the sequence of the whole genome, many
were concerned that such sequencing violated the many thousands of
patents on isolated DNA molecules.294  Some noted that if “gene pat-
ents are broadly upheld, a company that wants to sequence someone’s
entire genome, rather than just a few genes, could in theory have to
pay a fee, or ‘toll,’ to the patent holders for each of those patented
genes”295—an outcome that could severely limit the ability of DTC
companies to stay in business or keep genomic testing affordable.  The
Advisory Committee also expressed concern that the “substantial
number of existing patents on genes and methods of diagnosis also
pose a threat to the development of . . . whole-genome
sequencing . . . .”296
Attorneys in the Myriad case, however, “disagreed vigorously
about whether [genomic sequencing] would infringe Myriad’s pat-
ents.”297  Some argue that because composition of matter claims pat-
ent “isolated” genetic material (which they must do to be patentable in
the first place), and because most genomic sequencing does not actu-
ally isolate particular DNA sequences, genomic sequencing does not
actually infringe on the “composition of matter” patent claims.298  Be-
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 4.
293. See Price—Gene Patents, supra note 276.
294. See id.; see also W. Nicholson Price II, Unblocked Future: Why Gene Patents Won’t
Hinder Whole-Genome Sequencing and Personalized Medicine, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1601 (2012) [hereinafter Price—Unblocked Future] (noting that the viola-
tion of many patents was a major concern surrounding genomic sequencing).
295. Ghose, supra note 283.
296. Letter from Teutsch to Sebelius—March, 2010, supra note 286.
297. Price—Unblocked Future, supra note 294, at 1605.
298. See Price—Gene Patents, supra note 276.
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cause next-generation sequencing techniques do not locate “isolated”
DNA molecules,299 and because previous techniques generally read
strands of DNA too short to be covered by most genetic patents,300
genomic sequencing was not thought to infringe on patents covering
isolated portions of genetic material.
The Supreme Court evaluated the patenting of genetic material in
2013 with the Myriad case.301  The Court was faced with the question
of “whether a naturally occurring segment of DNA is patent eligible
under 35 U.S.C. §101 by virtue of its isolation from the rest of the
human genome.”302  Myriad Genetics, the company holding the pat-
ents at issue, had identified the exact location of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes on chromosomes 17 and 13.  Three mutations on these
genes in particular are associated with an increased risk of cervical
and breast cancer.  Knowing how to identify the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes allowed Myriad Genetics to establish what an unaffected genetic
sequence would look like—which enabled them to create a test to rec-
ognize a sequence affected by the any of the three mutations.303  Myr-
iad Genetics then applied for and received a number of patents giving
rise to several different composition claims.304  The practical effect of
Myriad Genetics’ patents and claims was to “give it the exclusive right
to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes”305 and hold a vir-
tual monopoly over genetic tests intended to recognize mutations asso-
ciated with breast and cervical cancer.
To determine whether these patents were legitimate, the Court
had to answer the question of whether Myriad Genetics had patented
any “new and useful . . . composition of matter”306 or whether PTO
had incorrectly allowed the patenting of a naturally occurring sub-
stance.  The Court noted that it “is undisputed that Myriad [Genetics]
did not create or alter any of the genetic information encoded in the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.”307  The Court recognized that Myriad Ge-
netics had “found an important and useful gene, but separating that
gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention.
Groundbreaking, innovative, or even brilliant discovery does not by
itself satisfy the §101 inquiry.”308  The Court recognized the “consider-
able danger that the grant of patents would ‘tie up’ the use of such
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2017 (2013).
302. Id. at 2111.
303. Id. at 2112.
304. Id. at 2113.
305. Id.  “[P]atents would also give Myriad the exclusive right to synthetically create
BRCA cDNA.”  Id.
306. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
307. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116.
308. Id. at 2117.
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[genetic-testing] tools and thereby ‘inhibit future innovation premised
upon them’”309 and held that “a naturally occurring DNA segment is a
product of nature and not patent eligible merely because it has been
isolated.”310
Within hours of the Supreme Court’s decision, a number of compa-
nies and academic laboratories announced that they would offer
breast and cervical cancer genetic testing at a lower price than the
$4000 charged by Myriad Genetics.311  Several weeks later, however,
Myriad Genetics sued two of these competitors—Ambry Genetics and
Gene By Gene312—claiming that the genetic testing nevertheless in-
fringed on Myriad Genetics remaining patents not invalidated by the
Supreme Court.313  In February 2014, Myriad Genetics and Gene By
Gene settled, with Gene by Gene agreeing to cease selling or market-
ing BRCA testing alone or in gene panels in North America.  Under
the agreement, Gene by Gene can continue to sell and market its gen-
ome, exome, and custom array products—which all include variants
for BRCA 1 and BRCA 2.314
E. State Law’s Regulation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing
In addition to federal agencies and case law, state laws could also
add a diversity of protections to DTC genetic testing.  Twenty-five
states either prohibit or limit DTC testing in CLIA laboratories, ad-
309. Id. at 2116.
310. Id. at 2111.  The Court also held, however, “that cDNA is patent eligible because
it is not naturally occurring.” Id.  This is so because “the natural creation of
mRNA involves splicing that removes introns, the synthetic DNA created from
mRNA also contains only the exon sequences.  This synthetic DNA created in the
laboratory from mRNA is known as complementary DNA (cDNA).” Id. at 2112.
Because cDNA is not a “product of nature,” it is patent eligible. Id. at 2119.  The
Court did explicitly note however that it had not deliberated or decided upon “the
patentability of DNA in which the order of the naturally occurring nucleotides
has been altered,” as “[s]cientific alteration of the genetic code presents a differ-
ent inquiry,” and expressed no opinion about its patentability. Id. at 2120. Myr-
iad therefore leaves open the possibility of patenting highly engineered strands of
DNA and raises questions about the patentability of DNA that has been trivially
altered in nonnatural ways. See Claire Laporte et al., So Now What? Implica-
tions of the Supreme Court’s Myriad Ruling, FOLEY HOAG LLC (June 17, 2013),
http://www.foleyhoag.com/publications/alerts-and-updates/2013/june/implica-
tions-of-the-supreme-court-myriad-ruling.
311. Andrew Pollack, 2 Competitors Sued by Genetics Company for Patent Infringe-
ment, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2013, at B3.
312. Id.
313. Id.  Going forward, Myriad has announced that it will expand operations in Eu-
rope relying not on its patents, “but on its proprietary database of associations
between gene variants and clinical outcomes.”  Conley, supra note 279.
314. BRCA Patent Owners and Gene by Gene, Ltd. Resolve Suit, MYRIAD (Feb. 7, 2014),
investor.myriad.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=824154.
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ding an additional layer of constraint.315  For example, some states
have their own laboratory analytic validity assurances, requiring that
laboratories follow both the federal CLIA standards as well as addi-
tional state requirements.  Washington and New York state are at
least partially exempt from federal standards as their own regulations
either meet or exceed protections provided by CLIA.316
In addition to enhanced CLIA protections, thirteen states com-
pletely prohibit DTC genetic testing.317  Another twelve states limit
consumer access to DTC testing in some respect,318 such as by prohib-
iting DTC testing of all but a few exempted tests (e.g., cholesterol or
pregnancy tests)319 or limiting the ordering of testing and return of
results to licensed healthcare professionals or persons performing offi-
cial duties.320  23andMe, for example, has responded to these state
restrictions by stating on its Web site that, while it is “authorized to
ship sample collection kits” to the state of New York, it cannot process
saliva collected in or mailed from the state.  It suggests that consum-
ers “collect [their] sample[s] and mail [them] from outside the state of
New York” and “affirm under penalty of law that the sample[s] for the
saliva kit ha[ve] not been collected in or mailed from the state of New
York.”321
***
Several federal agencies, including FDA, FTC, and CMS, in con-
junction with case and state law, can help ensure that DTC genetic
testing is valid, reliable, and of clinical use to consumers.  FDA, how-
315. See GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV., SURVEY OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER TESTING STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 1–14 (2007), available at http://
www.dnapolicy.org/resources/DTCStateLawChart.pdf.
316. CLIA Certificate of Waiver Fact Sheet, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/testing/lab/
clia/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
317. These states include Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ten-
nessee, and Wyoming. GENETICS & PUB. POLICY CTR., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV.,
supra note 315.
318. These states include Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Ma-
ryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. See id.
319. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1246.5 (Parker 2013) (“The tests that may be
conducted pursuant to this section are: pregnancy, glucose level, cholesterol, oc-
cult blood, and any other test for which there is a test for a particular analyte
approved by the federal Food and Drug Administration for sale to the public
without a prescription in the form of an over-the-counter test kit.”).
320. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 58-1.7 (2000) (“[A] clinical labora-
tory shall examine specimens only at the request of licensed physicians or other
persons authorized by law to use the findings of laboratory examinations in their
practice or the performance of their official duties.”).
321. Is the 23andMe Service Available in the State of New York?, 23ANDME, https://
customercare.23andme.com/entries/23150752-Is-the-23andMe-service-available-
in-the-state-of-New-York- (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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ever, is currently the agency that has engaged most extensively with
the industry and also appears to be the best-positioned in terms of
regulatory oversight and administrative structure to exert influence
over it going forward.  The remainder of this Article will therefore fo-
cus on FDA’s options and challenges in regulating DTC genetic
testing.
IV. REGULATING BIFURCATED DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER
GENETIC-TESTING ENTITIES
With the clearance of the Illumina sequencing devices, the
23andMe Warning Letter, and 23andMe’s current hiatus from the
DTC genetic health-related information market, the state of DTC ge-
netic testing changed dramatically at the end of 2013.  But there was
already a new genetic interpretation platform waiting in the wings.
Even before November 2013, two distinct new types of entities had
begun to emerge—those that provide genetic data (the As, Ts, Cs, and
Gs in an individual’s genome) and those that interpret the genetic ma-
terial to produce medical information (informing consumers of dis-
ease-related risks, personalized responses to medicine and ancestry,
and other biomedical information).  Both of these types of entities pose
serious challenges to FDA’s current regulatory structure.  While FDA
has stated that producing genetic data alone (presumably without the
intent that that data will be used to create medical information—such
as when Illumina was providing genetic data for 23andMe to interpret
in 2010)322 will not be considered a device under the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, the medical claims resulting from genetic interpretation
most likely will, thereby posing unique hurdles for regulators.
A. The Bifurcation of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic-Testing
Entities
Following FDA’s initial round of DTC genetic-testing Untitled Let-
ters, a number of entities that had previously provided DTC data and
interpretation services modified their business models.  Many DTC ge-
netic-testing companies, such as the DTC branch of deCODE, went
out of business.323  Other companies, like Pathway, transitioned to a
model that required a physician-intermediary.324  Some newer compa-
nies, however, began selling bifurcated products—offering either ge-
netic data or interpretation-only services.325
322. See Letter to Flately, supra note 186.
323. DECODEME, http://www.decodeme.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“Sales of Ge-
netic Scans direct to consumer through deCODEme have been discontinued!”).
324. FAQs, PATHWAY GENOMICS, https://www.pathway.com/about-us/faqs (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013).
325. DNA DTC, GENE BY GENE LTD., GENE BY GENE LAUNCHES DNA DTC (Nov. 29,
2012), available at http://www.genebygene.com/pdf/gbglaunchesdtc.pdf.
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In November 2012, Gene By Gene, Ltd. announced its new DNA
DTC branch offering “highly reliable and competitively priced genomic
testing solutions to institutional customers as well as to the Direct-to-
Consumer market.”326  DNA DTC notes, however, that “data analysis”
is not included in the package—that it is selling “raw data” or only the
genomic sequence.327  While other companies, such as 23andMe, had
allowed consumers to download their genetic data in addition to offer-
ing analysis services,328 DNA DTC’s emergence in the market is the
first time that a leading DTC company has offered a product without
any related medical interpretation.329  In addition, after its Warning
Letter, 23andMe has scaled back to just offering raw genetic data
without health-related interpretation (and ancestry information).330
For the majority of consumers, however, a file of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs
does not provide helpful information—data services require a parallel
offering of interpretation-only services to provide a marketable
product.331
One example of this type of interpretation-only service is openSNP,
which markets itself as allowing “customers of direct-to-customer ge-
netic tests to publish their test results, find others with similar ge-
netic variation, learn more about their results, get the latest primary
literature on their variants and help scientists find new associa-
tions.”332 openSNP is an open-source project and is compatible with
genetic data from 23andMe, deCODEme, or FamilyTreeDNA.333  Con-
326. Id.  DNA DTC priced its genomic sequencing at $6995.  A minimum order of three
samples is required.  Products, DNA DTC, http://www.dnadtc.com/products.aspx
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter DNA DTC—Products].
327. Id.
328. How Do I Find My Raw Data?, 23ANDME, https://customercare.23andme.com/en-
tries/21729836-How-do-I-find-my-raw-data- (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).  23andMe
performs “genotyping” as opposed to sequencing services and thus does not offer
“genomic” data. See, e.g., What’s the Difference Between Genotyping and Sequenc-
ing?, 23ANDME CUSTOMER CARE, https://customercare.23andme.com/entries/
21262606-What-is-the-difference-between-genotyping-and-sequencing- (last vis-
ited Jan. 3, 2013).
329. See Vorhaus—DNA DTC, supra note 17.
330. 23ANDME—Changes, supra note 167 (“Customers who purchase or have pur-
chased 23andMe’s Personal Genome Service (PGS) on or after November 22,
2013, the date of the Warning Letter from the FDA, will receive ancestry infor-
mation, as well as their raw genetic data without interpretation.”).
331. See Vorhaus—DNA DTC, supra note 17.
332. OPENSNP, http://opensnp.org/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).  In addition,
Promethease offers a report of medical information derived from genomic data.  It
offers a free report or a five-dollar report with several enhancements.
Promethease/Features, SNPEDIA, http://www.snpedia.com/index.php/Prome
thease/Features (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
333. OPENSNP, supra note 332.  There are other available programs that allow a user
to upload data derived from a source requiring a physician order, e.g., Illumina’s
99-cent MyGenome app for the iPad.  Illumina, Inc., MyGenome, ITUNES, https://
itunes.apple.com/us/app/mygenome/id516405838?mt=8 (last visited Nov. 3,
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sumers can upload their genetic data into openSNP, even if generated
by a DTC company that only provides ancestry analysis (like the cur-
rent 23andMe offering), for interpretation free of charge.334
Promethease, a tool used to build a personalized genetic medical infor-
mation report “based on SNPedia and a file of genotypes,”335 offers
another free basic report and an enhanced report for five dollars.336
These interpretation services do not require access to the biological
specimen from which the original data was generated.337
B. Regulating Entities Producing Genetic Data
As discussed in Part III of this Article, FDA has jurisdictional au-
thority to regulate products “intended for use in the diagnosis of dis-
ease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or
prevention of disease . . . .”338  Genetic data in the hands of a layper-
son cannot diagnose, cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease in and of
itself.339  Expertise required to convert such data into medical infor-
mation can require “molecular and computational biologists, geneti-
cists, pathologists and physicians with exquisite knowledge of the
disease and of treatment modalities, research nurses, genetic counsel-
ors, and IT and systems support specialists, among others.”340  Also, it
is possible that the intended use of providing genetic data might be for
strictly ancestral purposes or for no specific stated purpose at all, de-
pending on how a company marketed and sold the instrument, which
2013).  MyGenome only allows consumers to explore a genome sequenced by the
Illumina Clinical Services Laboratory (which requires a physician order). Indi-
vidual Genome Sequencing (IGS) for Patients/Guardians, ILLUMINA, http://www.
illumina.com/clinical/illumina_clinical_laboratory/igs_for_patients.ilmn (last vis-
ited Nov. 3, 2013). See, e.g., Ancestry, 23ANDMe, https://www.23andme.com/an-
cestry/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013); Take a More Active Role in Managing Your
Health, 23ANDME https://www.23andme.com/health/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013)
(this portion of the Web page has since been taken down in response to FDA’s
November 22, 2013 Warning Letter to 23andMe).  FamilyTreeDNA markets its
data for ancestry use but produces identical genetic data to those used for medi-
cal purposes. FAMILYTREEDNA, http://www.familytreedna.com/ (last visited Nov.
3, 2013).
334. Frequently Asked Questions, OPENSNP, http://opensnp.org/faq (last visited Nov. 3,
2013).
335. Promethease, SNPEDIA, http://snpedia.com/index.php/Promethease (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013).
336. Promethease/Features, supra note 332.
337. Palmer, supra note 42, at 510.
338. Is the Product a Medical Device?, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/device
regulationandguidance/overview/classifyyourdevice/ucm051512.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2013).
339. As discussed in Part III of this Article, devices are “intended for use in the diag-
nosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or pre-
vention of disease.” Id.
340. Elaine R Mardis, The $1,000 Genome, the $100,000 Analysis?, 2 GENOME MED. 84,
84 (2010).
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likely would fall outside of the current understanding of the definition
of a medical device.
In the press release announcing DNA DTC, Gene By Gene Presi-
dent Bennett Greenspan described its new branch as for “investiga-
tors exploring the cutting edge of research to pioneer and enhance
treatment of disease, enhance quality of life, break new ground in gen-
ealogical inquiry and otherwise advance the science of genomics.”341
This description could be construed to sound as if DNA DTC data is
being marketed for researchers to interpret and use in the diagnosis,
treatment, or prevention of disease; however, DNA DTC’s understated
Web site makes no such claims.342  The Web site also states that the
genomic data it provides is for “research use only,”343 although, as dis-
cussed above, if DNA DTC has knowledge that its product is being
used for diagnostic purposes, it will be considered “mislabeled” under
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.344
If DNA DTC’s research use only labeling holds up to scrutiny, how-
ever, it appears that FDA will remain uninvolved.  FDA representa-
tives have stated that if companies that just provide raw genetic data
“don’t make any medical claims about that data, then they’re free to
provide information as far as we’re concerned.”345
C. The Challenges of Regulating Entities That Provide
Genetic Information
Unlike DTC genetic data services, which are unlikely to fall under
FDA regulations both because they do not meet FDA’s definition of a
device and because FDA representatives have disclaimed an interest
in regulating them, FDA has regulated companies’ interpretations of
medical claims based on genetic data generated by a different labora-
tory.346  Regulation of this type requires locating the source of juris-
dictional authority, which, in this new type of case, must be done by
reasoning analogically to other areas in which FDA has already regu-
lated.  Any attempts at FDA regulation will also have to contend with
the formidable First Amendment challenges associated with limiting
the free speech of Internet-based genetic interpretation services that
do not charge the consumer.
341. DNA DTC, GENE BY GENE LTD., supra note 325.
342. DNA DTC, http://www.dnadtc.com/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
343. Id.
344. See FDA—RESEARCH USE ONLY, supra note 127, at 10.
345. Carmichael—DNA Dilemma, supra note 191.
346. Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125.
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1. Regulating DTC Web-Based Genetic Interpretation Services:
In Search of an Analogy
As discussed in section IV.B of this Article, FDA has considered
medical information from companies that only interpret genetic data
from an outside laboratory to be a medical device.347  DTC Web-based
genetic interpretation services, however, pose new challenges to
FDA’s regulatory position.  In seeking to regulate these new interpre-
tation services, FDA will likely look to analogous areas where it has
chosen either to regulate products as medical devices or to exercise
regulatory discretion (by not enforcing its regulations against viola-
tors).  Areas that raise similar concerns as DTC Web-based genetic
interpretation—and which therefore might serve as a locus of jurisdic-
tional authority—include WebMD, mobile medical devices, and
software applications.
a. WebMD’s Symptom Checker
Entities that interpret genetic data, providing an information-only
product without testing biological samples, might—at first glance—
appear analogous to medical Web-based information generated by, for
example, WebMD’s “Symptom Checker.”  Both are online portals that
allow users to input specific pieces of information and receive health-
related medical information in return.  Both are widely accessible (a
consideration taken into account when FDA considers classification
risk): Sixty million unique users visit WebMD-related sites every
month, and DTC genetic-testing services were similarly widely availa-
ble online until recently.348  And both give rise to the possibility that
individuals will make medical decisions on the basis of medical infor-
mation generated without clinician involvement (WebMD users report
user-generated content on sites has a “strong impact on their health
or . . . treatment decisions,”349 and FDA cited the concern that the
public might make medical decisions on the basis of DTC genetic test
results as a motivation for enforcement of their regulations350).  But
while FDA sent DTC genetic-testing entities Untitled and Warning
Letters requiring clearance or approval as a medical device, the seem-
ingly analogous WebMD has been unregulated as a device and, in fact,
347. Id.
348. Wayne Gattinella, President & CEO, WebMD Health Corp., Testimony on the
Promotion of Food and Drug Administration-Regulated Medical Products Using
the Internet and Social Media Tools 1 (Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/UCM193440.pdf.
349. Id.
350. Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125.
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has partnered with FDA on its Web site to assist the FDA in its mis-
sion to “protect and promote your health.”351
Some scholars have argued that there is a distinction under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act between products for the diagnosis of
disease and products for general “wellness.”352  Indeed there are many
different kinds of software applications available online, some through
the federal government, that are not considered devices but calculate
patient-specific risks based on standard epidemiological analysis.353
As discussed above, FDA regulates medical devices on the basis of the
intent of the manufacturer.  If health information is presented with
the intent to educate, rather than diagnose or treat, it will not be regu-
lated as a device—even if consumers use the information to self diag-
nose.354  WebMD’s Symptom Checker states (in grey font that a user
must scroll down to see): “This tool does not provide medical advice.  It
is intended for informational purposes only.  It is not a substitute for
professional medical advice, diagnosis or treatment.  Never ignore pro-
fessional medical advice in seeking treatment because of something
you have read on the WebMD Site . . . .”355  Recall, however, that
23andMe in its terms of service (in black font that was bolded) stated
that its products were “for research, informational, and educational
use only.  We do not provide medical advice.”356  But FDA based its
351. Protect Your Health: Food, Medical Product & Cosmetic Safety, WEBMD, http://
www.webmd.com/fda/default.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
352. BRADLEY MERRILL THOMPSON ET AL., MHEALTH REGULATORY COALITION, A CALL
FOR CLARITY: OPEN QUESTIONS ON THE SCOPE OF FDA REGULATION OF MHEALTH 9
(2010), available at http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/mrcwhitefinal122210.pdf.
353. See, e.g., Risk Assessment Tool for Estimating Your 10-year Risk of Having a
Heart Attack, NAT’L HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST., NAT’L INST. HEALTH, http://
cvdrisk.nhlbi.nih.gov/ (last visited Jan. 1, 2014); Joe Pickrell, Should the FDA
Regulate the Interpretation of Traditional Epidemiology?, GENOMES UNZIPPED:
PUB. PERS. GENOMICS (Feb. 12, 2013), http://www.genomesunzipped.org/2013/12/
should-the-fda-regulate-the-interpretation-of-traditional-epidemiology.php (last
visited Jan. 1, 2013) (“[A]ll of the scientific points made about risk prediction
from 23andMe (the models are not very predictive, they’re missing a lot of impor-
tant variables, there are likely errors in measurements, etc.) of course apply to
traditional epidemiology as well.  Ultimately, I think a lot rides on the question:
what is the aspect of 23andMe that sets them apart from these websites and
makes them more suspect? Is it because they focus on genetic risk factors rather
than ‘traditional’ risk factors (though note several of these sites ask about family
history, which of course implicitly includes genetic information)?  Is it the fact
that they’re a for-profit company selling a product? . . . Is it because some genetic
risk factors (like BRCA1) have strong effects, while standard epidemiological risk
factors are usually of small effect? Or is it something else?”).
354. Alex Krouse, Note, iPads, iPhones, Androids, and Smartphones: FDA Regulation
of Mobile Phone Applications As Medical Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 756
(2012).
355. WebMD Symptom Checker, WEBMD, http://symptoms.webmd.com/#introView
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
356. 23ANDME—Terms of Service, supra note 224.
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jurisdictional analysis on 23andMe’s marketing and intent for the in-
formation, which, it concluded, was to enable users to “take steps to-
ward mitigating serious diseases.”357  It appears, therefore, that FDA
has interpreted WebMD to fall under this general wellness exemption,
but it is unlikely to be the model for regulation of DTC genetic-inter-
pretation services.
b. Mobile Medical Devices
FDA has recently focused on regulating the mobile medical appli-
cation market, releasing draft guidance for products that meet the def-
inition of a medical device but are also either “used as an accessory to
a regulated medical device, or transform[ ] a mobile platform into a
regulated medical device.”358  This definition includes software appli-
cations that “can be executed . . . on a mobile platform, or a web-based
software application that is tailored to a mobile platform but is exe-
cuted on a server.”359  Similar to the reasoning discussed in the
WebMD context, FDA has carved out an exemption from regulation
for information provided by a mobile medical application for “general
health and wellness” not intended for diagnosing or treating a specific
disease.360  But, FDA has expressed specific interest in regulating mo-
bile applications that allow users to “input patient-specific informa-
tion [such as ‘patient-specific lab results’] and—using formulae or a
processing algorithm—output a patient-specific result, diagnosis, or
treatment recommendation that is used in clinical practice or to assist
in making clinical decisions.”361
DTC Web-based genetic interpretation platforms such as openSNP
and Promethease most likely will not fit the narrow definition of a
mobile medical device presented in the draft guidance.  Neither pro-
gram transforms a mobile platform itself into a medical device (such
as an application that turns an iPhone into a cardiac event monitor
that the consumer can press to his or her chest),362 and neither is tai-
lored to a mobile platform (although they can be accessed on a mobile
device).363  Despite the fact that they do not appear to fall under the
mobile medical application draft guidance, however, DTC Web-based
357. Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
358. FDA, DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
STAFF: MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 7 ( 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/MedicalDevices/. . ./UCM263366.pdf.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 11.
361. Id. at 19.
362. Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution? (SMU Dedman Sch. of L., Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 128, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2284448##.
363. Both Web sites can be retrieved on a mobile platform but are only available as
full Web sites as opposed to tailored mobile platforms.
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genetic-interpretation entities provide services that raise many of the
same concerns as mobile medical applications—including the input of
patient-specific laboratory results that lead to patient-specific results
using formulae.
c. Software Applications
Although DTC Web-based genetic interpretation entities are un-
likely to be regulated as mobile medical applications specifically, FDA
also regulates software generally.  FDA first expressed an interest in
regulating software beginning in 1987, in the wake of several
software-related radiation deaths.  At the time, FDA promulgated
draft guidance entitled FDA Draft Policy for the Regulation of Com-
puter Products.364  FDA subsequently withdrew this guidance in
2005.365
In its 2010 Untitled Letters to Knome and 23andMe, FDA in-
formed these entities that they were diagnostic devices given that
they were software programs analyzing genetic data “generated by an
external laboratory in order to generate a patient specific test re-
port.”366  Based upon existing genetic data, openSNP and
Promethease conduct interpretation and produce patient-specific med-
ical information.  Like Knome and 23andMe, because these new DTC
Web-based genetic interpretation platforms perform the same func-
tion as companies previously receiving Untitled and Warning Letters
and produce patient-specific results rather than provide mere general
health and wellness information, FDA would most likely consider
them to be diagnostic medical devices.367
2. First Amendment Challenges to Regulation
A serious attempt by FDA to regulate DTC genetic interpretation
services is likely to come under First Amendment scrutiny.  Recently,
in Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman in D.C., FDA challenged
the applicability of the First Amendment to its regulation of “off-label”
364. Draft Policy for the Regulation of Computer Products, 52 Fed. Reg. 36,104 (Sept.
25, 1987).
365. In 2005, FDA released new guidance on 510(k) submissions for software “con-
tained in” medical devices, although it appears that this guidance will not apply
to genomic interpretation entities because the software they use is not “contained
in” a medical device—it is the medical device. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE
FOR INDUSTRY AND FDA STAFF: GUIDANCE FOR THE CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUB-
MISSIONS FOR SOFTWARE CONTAINED IN MEDICAL DEVICES 2 (2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/
GuidanceDocuments/ucm089593.pdf.
366. Letter from Gutierrez to Conde, supra note 125.
367. Likewise, as they use data generated from an outside laboratory, they would also
not fall under the laboratory developed test exemption.  For more discussion, see
Palmer, supra note 42, at 513.
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speech (speech that promotes the use of drugs or devices in ways that
have not been specifically approved by FDA) on two grounds that
could both apply to the regulation of DTC Web-based genetic interpre-
tation services.  In Friedman, FDA attempted to characterize its gui-
dance on off-label speech as a restriction on conduct rather than
speech.368  The D.C. Circuit was “highly skeptical” of the agency’s po-
sition,369 noting that off-label speech is “only ‘conduct’ to the extent
that moving one’s lips is ‘conduct.’”370  FDA also argued that the First
Amendment does not apply when speech “occurs in an area of exten-
sive government regulation.”371  The Court also rejected this
argument.
The scope of FDA’s ability to regulate speech in these cases often
turns on whether or not the speech at issue is considered “commer-
cial.”372  If a regulated entity’s speech is considered commercial, FDA
has greater power to ensure that the speech is not false or misleading.
FDA can also compel particular speech, impose prior restraints, and
limit even accurate speech.373  If the speech is not considered commer-
cial, FDA is subject to much stricter limitations as to what extent
speech can be limited.374
In recent years, FDA has faced considerable difficulty when con-
fronted by First Amendment challenges to its attempts at regulating
commercial speech.375  In Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center,376 the Supreme Court struck down a provision of the Food and
Drug Modernization Act that exempted compounding pharmacies
from certain provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provided
that pharmacies did not advertise or promote their products.  The pro-
vision was found to place an unconstitutional restriction on commer-
cial speech.377  In Pearson v. Shalala,378 the D.C. Circuit held that
FDA’s outright ban on proposed health claims made by dietary supple-
368. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1998).
369. Krista Hessler Carver, A Global View of the First Amendment Constraints on
FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151, 182 (2008).
370. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
371. Id. at 60.
372. For a discussion of this issue, see Nathan Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated
Firms Ever Be Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 388 (2011) [hereinafter Cor-
tez—Noncommercial].
373. See id. at 388.
374. Id.
375. For a more extensive look at the First Amendment challenges that FDA has faced
and for an argument that “many of the agency’s speech-related policies violate
the First Amendment,” see Gerald Masoudi & Christopher Pruitt, Food and Drug
Administration v. The First Amendment: A Survey of Recent FDA Enforcement,
21 HEALTH MATRIX 111 (2011).
376. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
377. Id. at 371–77.
378. 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. (1999)).
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ment manufacturers failed constitutional commercial speech scru-
tiny.379  And in the recent decision United States v. Caronia,380 the
Second Circuit held that the First Amendment protects the truthful
promotion of a drug, even for medical indications not specifically ap-
proved by FDA and included on the labeling, and that the government
cannot prosecute speech about an FDA-approved product—even if the
product is being promoted for something FDA did not specifically clear
(e.g., a sales representative is allowed to promote an FDA-approved
drug for the treatment of insomnia as a treatment for narcolepsy).381
The test for determining whether speech should be considered
“commercial” and receive less robust constitutional protections was
first established in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products.382 Bolger defines
commercial speech as speech that either proposes a commercial trans-
action or speech that satisfies a three-prong test.383  Speech proposes
a commercial transaction when it states, for example, “I will sell you
the X . . . at the Y price.”384  The three-prong test asks:
1. Whether speech is an “advertisement?”385
2. Whether the speech at issue refers to a “specific product?”386
and
3. Whether the speaker has an “economic motivation” for engag-
ing in the speech?387
Speech satisfying all three factors will be considered commercial.  It is
not clear, however, whether speech satisfying only one or two of those
factors would be.388
The case of Washington Legal Foundation v. Friedman—consider-
ing FDA’s regulation of off-label speech—provides an instructive com-
parison for any analysis of how a court might assess whether DTC
genetic interpretation services should be considered commercial.  In
its analysis, the D.C. Federal District Court found that the off-label
379. Id. at 651–52, 658.
380. 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012).
381. Id.
382. 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
383. Id. at 66–67; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (serving as a precursor to Bolger).  Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67 (1983).
384. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
385. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 66–67.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. See, e.g., id. at 60, 67 (1983) (noting that none of the factors by themselves would
“compel the conclusion that they are commercial speech”); see also Masoudi &
Pruitt, supra note 375, at 121 (“Speech fulfilling all three of these factors will
almost surely be considered commercial, but it is unsettled whether speech meet-
ing only one or two of these factors will be considered commercial in nature.”).  At
least one scholar has noted that economic motivation alone is insufficient to con-
sider speech commercial. See Carver, supra note 369, at 170.
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speech at issue proposed a commercial transaction because the speech
“suggest[s] that a physician should prescribe—and a consumer will
therefore purchase—the subject drug.”389  The Court also concluded
that each of the Bolger factors was satisfied.  First, the off-label speech
was found to fall under a broad definition of “advertisement”—a defi-
nition that included materials that “call[ ] public attention to [the
product] . . . so as to arouse a desire to buy.”390  Second, the off-label
speech at issue was found to refer to a specific product because the
manufacturers only distributed reprints of articles that specifically
discussed their products.391  Third, the off-label speech was found to
have an “economic motivation” because the materials were distributed
in hopes of increasing sales.392  Accordingly, because each of the fac-
tors was satisfied, the Court found that the off-label speech at issue
should be considered commercial.
It is unlikely that some DTC genetic-interpretation services would
similarly be considered commercial speech.  FDA would have difficulty
arguing that services like openSNP, which allows users to access Web-
based genetic interpretation services free of charge, are commercial.
openSNP likely does not propose a commercial transaction;393 it inter-
prets data that has been uploaded by the user. openSNP’s Web site
also most likely would not be considered an “advertisement,” as there
is nothing available for purchase.  In addition, openSNP is not eco-
nomically motivated as a “speaker” (recognizing the inherent ambigu-
ity of that term as applied to an open-source online platform), as it
provides a free service.  Lastly, although the speech at issue refers to a
specific product, it is unlikely that satisfying this factor alone would
be sufficient to render openSNP’s DTC Web-based genetic-interpreta-
tion service “commercial.”394
In 1976, the Supreme Court, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. VA Citizens Consumer Council, recognized that even commercial
speech warrants some First Amendment protection and found that the
public’s interest in commercial speech might be “as keen, if not keener
by far” than its interest in political debate.395  The Court expressed a
strong preference for disclosure as opposed to suppression of informa-
389. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 64 (D.D.C. 1998).
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 334 (“We take the ‘open’ in openSNP seri-
ous, so everything is free of charge.”).
394. Such services propose a commercial transaction: the speech could be considered
an advertisement under the broader Friedman definition, the speech at issue re-
fers to a specific product, and the speaker has an economic motivation.  For-profit
interpretation services that charge a fee for the interpretation of large-scale ge-
netic sequences are more likely to be considered commercial.
395. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1976).
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tion396 and expressed “disdain for arguments that audiences cannot
comprehend truthful information.”397  Accordingly, the Court struck
down a state law ban against the advertising of prescription drug
prices.398
Thus, to the extent the speech of DTC Web-based genetic interpre-
tation services is—however unlikely—considered commercial, regula-
tions on such speech would be evaluated in accordance with a case
decided later that same year.  In Central Hudson Gas Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Central Hudson, the Supreme Court again reconsidered
the First Amendment’s protections for commercial speech.399 Central
Hudson articulates a four-part test for determining whether and how
commercial speech can be regulated constitutionally.400
The first prong of Central Hudson requires determining whether
the commercial speech at issue is inherently false or misleading.401
Commercial speech that is inherently misleading—that cannot be
made nonmisleading by disclaimers or qualifying language or that
“experience has proved [to be] subject to abuse”402—can be banned
outright.403  Commercial speech that is only potentially misleading
should be regulated using less restrictive means, such as disclaim-
ers.404  The first prong also allows the government to regulate com-
mercial speech if the underlying subject matter concerns an activity
that is, itself, illegal.405  For example, the Supreme Court upheld a
ban on commercial sex-based employment listings in a newspaper.406
The second prong asks whether the government can assert a sub-
stantial interest in regulating the speech in question,407 meaning that
the speech at issue poses a real, rather than hypothetical, harm.408
The government can generally satisfy this requirement with ease, as
courts have found a wide range of interests sufficiently “substan-
tial.”409  In the context of FDA regulation of commercial speech, the
396. Id. at 769–70.
397. Carver, supra note 369, at 171.
398. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
399. See Cortez—Noncommercial, supra note 372, at 389.
400. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
401. Id.
402. See Carver, supra note 372, at 172 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 206–07
(1982)).
403. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
404. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748.
405. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 (1973).
406. Id. at 389.
407. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
408. Courts have found that the government has not satisfied this requirement in only
a handful of cases.  Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12–17 (1979).
409. For a description of government interests that the Supreme Court has classified
as “substantial” and for the handful of instances in which the Court has not found
this prong to be satisfied, see Carver, supra note 369, at 173.
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government’s interest in preserving the new drug application ap-
proval process—analogous to the Class III device approval process—
was considered substantial by the Supreme Court,410 as was the gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting the public health and guarding
against deceptive market practices.411
The third Central Hudson prong asks whether the government’s
regulation directly advances this substantial interest.412  The govern-
ment must show that its regulation directly and consistently advances
its goals,413 that the regulation alleviates harm to a material degree,
and that the connection between the two does not consist of “mere
speculation or conjecture.”414  The regulation of speech must also be
both consistent and rational.415  The Supreme Court has generally up-
held limitations on speech where the government presented such jus-
tificatory evidence.416
The fourth and final prong of the test asks whether the regulation
is both narrowly tailored and restricts no more speech than is neces-
sary.417  In other words, “regulating speech must be a last, not first,
resort.”418  The fourth prong is not satisfied if “numerous and obvious
less-burdensome alternatives” exist.419  In the several instances in
which FDA has sought to ban speech outright, rather than requiring a
disclaimer or pursuing other means of regulating speech, courts have
generally found that FDA’s restrictions fail this prong.  This failure
renders the FDA restrictions unconstitutional and unenforceable.420
Again, the Friedman case is instructive as to how a court would
apply the Central Hudson test in the context of DTC genetic interpre-
tation services.  With regard to FDA’s restriction on off-label speech,
FDA argued that the speech at issue failed the inherently-false or mis-
leading prong of Central Hudson both because the speech itself was
illegal and because the safety and efficacy claims lacked FDA ap-
410. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 362–65 (2002).
411. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 655–56 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
412. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
413. See Carver, supra note 369, at 174.
414. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71 (1993).
415. See Carver, supra note 369, at 174.
416. See id.
417. Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
418. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
419. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418 n.13 (1993).
420. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373 (noting that FDA’s guidance exempting com-
pounding drugs from certain regulations provided that they do not advertise
failed the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test because the government did
not justify its failure to seek alternative means of regulation); Pearson v. Shalala,
164 F.3d 650, 657–58 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the government’s refusal to
adopt a disclaimer policy caused it to fail prong four and that the fourth prong
could not be satisfied “when the government chooses a policy of suppression over
disclosure—at least where there is no showing that disclosure would not suffice
to cure the misleadingness”).
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proval, which rendered the claims inherently misleading.  The D.C.
Federal District Court rejected both of these claims, noting that the
underlying activity to which the speech pertained—physician pre-
scription of an off-label use—was decidedly legal421 and found that
the speech was not otherwise inherently misleading.422  As is gener-
ally the case, the Court found the government satisfied the second
prong, concluding that the government’s interest in providing incen-
tives for obtaining new drug approval was “substantial.”  The Court
did, however, reject FDA’s claimed interest in ensuring that physi-
cians receive accurate information as a paternalistic notion that phy-
sicians, “a sophisticated audience, cannot evaluate the validity of
promotional materials.”423  The Court found prong three—the re-
quirement that the restriction directly advance the government’s as-
serted interest—satisfied because mandating that manufacturers
promote their products “on label” encouraged them to pursue addi-
tional FDA approval for any other indications for which they wished to
promote their products.424  But the Court found the policy to fail
prong four (requiring that regulations restrict no more speech than is
necessary)425 because FDA completely banned off-label speech—
rather than considering less-restrictive measures, such as disclaim-
ers—and thus the Court held FDA’s enforcement unconstitutional.
Applying the Central Hudson test to DTC Web-based genetic inter-
pretation, it appears that any attempts by FDA to regulate or restrict
genetic interpretation would likely fail if FDA attempted to ban the
speech entirely—but could succeed if FDA merely required a dis-
claimer stating that the medical information presented is not evalu-
ated or approved by FDA.  Although FDA could likely establish a
substantial interest in the speech, satisfying prong two (either by as-
serting an interest in preserving its medical device approval process
or in protecting the public health), FDA might have difficulty satisfy-
ing prong one.  Certainly, FDA would be unable to prove that the
speech pertained to an illegal activity—interpreting genetic data is
currently legal; FDA might, however, succeed in showing that the in-
terpretive services are misleading if provided directly to a consumer
who has limited ability to understand the complex medical informa-
tion being conveyed.  Satisfaction of the third and fourth prong would
depend on the specific type of regulation that FDA proposed.  Any pro-
posed ban on the speech of entities that interpret genetic data would
likely fail prong four; more narrowly tailored approaches, however,
could survive constitutional scrutiny.
421. Wash. Legal Found. v. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 (D.D.C. 1998).
422. Id. at 67.
423. See Carver, supra note 369, at 183–84 (citing Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 69–71).
424. Friedman, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 71–72.
425. Id. at 73–74.
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Thus, if DTC Web-based genetic interpretation platforms are not
considered commercial speech, any regulation would be subject to
strict scrutiny, the most stringent standard of judicial review.  Oft de-
scribed as “strict in theory, fatal in fact,”426 strict scrutiny could pose
a barrier to speech regulation that FDA would have difficulty over-
coming.  When laws target noncommercial speech, the government
must demonstrate: (1) a compelling interest and (2) that the restric-
tion advances that interest using the least-restrictive means availa-
ble.427  Although the second factor under strict scrutiny addresses the
same concerns as prong four under Central Hudson’s test for commer-
cial speech, courts are generally more tolerant of restrictions on com-
mercial speech.428  Accordingly, if the speech of DTC Web-based
genetic-interpretation entities was not considered commercial (a dis-
tinct possibility for entities that provide such services at no cost), FDA
would face serious difficulties in regulating it.
V. RISK-BASED REGULATION OF ENTITIES THAT
INTERPRET GENETIC INFORMATION
As discussed in subsection III.A.1 of this Article, FDA’s device reg-
ulation structure imposes a classification system based on perceived
risk.  The higher the anticipated risk, the more involved FDA clear-
ance or approval of the device becomes.  In 2008, the Advisory Com-
mittee recommended that FDA use a risk-based approach for
assessing genetic testing,429 and other scholars have supported a “risk
stratification” approach to DTC genetic testing where FDA would clas-
sify and regulate lower-risk tests differently than higher-risk tests.430
The classification status of DTC genetic testing is currently unclear—
FDA representatives have noted that a genetic test for a benign trait
such as baldness, for example, would be considered a Class I device, if
considered a device at all;431 23andMe had been working with FDA on
Class II premarket clearance filings for its personal genome ser-
vice;432 and most recently, FDA informed 23andMe in its Warning
Letter that its personal genome service was going to be considered to
fall under Class III.433
426. See, e.g., Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 918 (7th Cir. 1996).
427. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868–70 (1997).
428. See Cortez—Noncommercial, supra note 372, at 391 (citing Nat Stern, In Defense
of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55, 65 (1999)).
429. SACGHS—2008, supra note 99, at 174.
430. McGuire et al., supra note 69, at 182.
431. Rita Rubin, FDA Groups Genetic Tests with Medical Devices, Requiring Approval,
USA TODAY (June 14, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2010-
06-15-genetictesting15_ST_N.htm.
432. See, e.g., Warning Letter to Wojcicki, supra note 8.
433. Id.
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But, as the DTC genetics industry moves from discrete genetic
tests to large-scale genetic and genomic interpretation, a test-by-test
assessment of the clinical validity of every association with every gene
becomes untenable.  First, assessing the medical implications of every
genetic variant for safety and effectiveness through either the
premarket clearance or approval process would be impossible.  Even if
FDA began such a byzantine task, by the time it finished its review,
scientific knowledge would have evolved and would require FDA to
evaluate related medical claims anew.434  Second, if FDA treats large-
scale genetic and genomic interpretation as a single device (as FDA
was possibly implying by informing 23andMe that its personal gen-
ome service “is in Class III”), each piece of medical information might
be required to follow the controls required of the riskiest piece of medi-
cal information produced.  This would require treating findings of a
predisposition to baldness the same as genetic mutations correlated
with Huntington’s disease.
Instead of treating the interpretation of much of or all of one’s gen-
ome as a single device, FDA could pursue regulation of the interpreta-
tion of large-scale genetic testing or genomic sequencing as a
compilation of smaller devices—an approach it was possibly working
toward with 23andMe before FDA issued its Warning Letter.  FDA
could classify each variant associated with a medical condition (or
group of variants associated with a medical condition) on the basis of
its individual risk and register, clear, and/or approve the test for each
variant on its own merits.  This would allow FDA to target the medical
interpretations that it feels carry the highest risk (e.g., those associ-
ated with breast cancer) for oversight, while allowing lower-risk inter-
pretations (e.g., those associated with the soapy taste of cilantro) to be
accessible to consumers with less regulatory involvement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Since its advent in 2007, DTC genetic testing has raised increas-
ingly complex regulatory and policy issues for the industry and regu-
lators alike.  For years, FDA exercised discretion and did not enforce
its device regulations against DTC genetic-testing entities.  FDA only
intervened when one DTC genetic-testing company considered selling
its product directly to customers in brick-and-mortar stores.  FDA
then sent Untitled Letters to a number of DTC companies.  Subse-
quently, many DTC genetic-testing companies stopped testing alto-
gether or required physician involvement.  In November 2013, FDA
sent its first DTC genetic-testing Warning Letter to 23andMe, one of
the few remaining providers of DTC genetic data and interpretation,
prompting the company to cease its health-related marketing indefi-
434. See Beaudet & Javitt, supra note 42.
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nitely.  While some companies had developed bifurcated services pre-
viously and had begun offering either genetic data or interpretation,
the fact that a leader in the DTC genetic-testing industry currently
provides only raw genetic data (and ancestry-related information)
might steer more consumers to open-source genetic-interpretation
platforms—exacerbating potential regulatory challenges.435
Entities that provide genetic data for research use only likely do
not fit within FDA’s definition of a device and will probably remain
unregulated by FDA.  The consequences of not regulating entities that
provide genetic data are not particularly significant in terms of risk to
consumers alone, as the data are unlikely to harm consumers who do
not also receive corresponding medical information.  Moreover, con-
cerns about the analytic validity of genetic data fall within the juris-
diction of CMS and CLIA and so can be regulated accordingly.
However, entities that provide genetic interpretation and corre-
sponding information to consumers can reveal more sensitive medical
information about an individual’s propensity to develop disease and
pharmacogenomic information about the efficacy of particular drugs
given a particular genetic makeup—which places these services
within FDA’s definition of a device.  Recently, many of these interpre-
tation services have developed as open-source, Web-based platforms
that interpret genetic data free of charge.  First Amendment chal-
lenges might thwart FDA’s attempts to regulate these entities.
The need for federal involvement continues to be publically recog-
nized.  From the Advisory Commission of 2008436 to the Presidential
Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues in 2013,437 federal advi-
435. In fact, some scholars in the arena have called for researchers to provide research
participants access to their raw genetic data to, among other things, give partici-
pants the option of independent analysis.  Jeantine E. Lunshof, George M.
Church & Barbara Prainsack, Raw Personal Data: Providing Access, 343 SCIENCE
373, 373–74 (2014). While discussing this article in a “Live Chat,” John Wilbanks,
the Vice President of Science at Science Commons, pointed out that following this
recommendation is another potential avenue for raw data entering the hands of
potential consumers directly: “Part of why I believe in [providing genetic research
participants with their raw data] is that I think that it’s going to . . . accelerate
the transition from data, to information, to knowledge, to wisdom . . . .  When the
data are really clustered in the hands of a small group of people . . . there’s no
pressure to create better tools . . . to make that transition more accurate, more
user-friendly, more pleasant, and more distributive . . . .  [I]f a lot of people have
raw data, that creates a market—that creates a market for startups, that creates
a market for publishers, and that creates a market for healthcare providers.”
John Wilbanks, Live Chat: Do You Have a Right to Your Personal Data?, SCIENCE
(Jan. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM) http://news.sciencemag.org/health/2014/01/live-chat-do-
you-have-right-your-personal-data.
436. SACGHS—2008, supra note 99, at 2.
437. See ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE, supra note 5 at 105 (“Federal agencies should
continue to evaluate regulatory oversight of direct-to-consumer health services to
ensure safety and reliability.”).
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sory panels have called for effective regulation of DTC genetic testing.
Several important lessons regarding this regulation can be gleaned
from the relationship between the industry and FDA over the past
four years in particular.  FDA will treat DTC genetic tests as medical
devices, and they will not fall under the laboratory developed test ex-
emption, or be protected by research use only labeling, if being mar-
keted or knowingly provided to companies for device indications.  FDA
will treat individual components, such as data, as a medical device if
knowingly sold to generate patient-specific information by down-
stream manufacturers.  And while FDA appears willing to consider
the most appropriate classification for DTC genetic tests on a case-by-
case basis, not validating individual tests might leave manufacturers
with their entire service classified as highest risk and requiring
premarket approval.
While FDA will face unique challenges engaging with the DTC ge-
netic interpretation industry, regulating large-scale genetic and geno-
mic interpretation similarly not as a single device, but as a
compilation of genetic medical claims, could allow FDA to effectively
target discrete genetic tests on the basis of risk to the consumer.  By
treating large-scale genetic and genomic interpretation as a compila-
tion of discrete genetic tests, lessons learned from past FDA engage-
ment can be applied to address the most concerning aspects of DTC
genetic testing without allowing the unique characteristics of the
evolving field to overwhelm the quality assurances already in place,
and without prohibiting direct consumer access to valid and useful ge-
netic information.
